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ABSTRACT 
!
There is an increasing unity about the importance of economic conditions of 
individuals and the natural resources of nation states in conflict studies. One section of 
the literature highlighting the economic nature of peace is the so-called capitalist peace 
theory, arguing for the importance of trade, globalisation and market values in peace-
building efforts. Advocates of the involvement of private business in post-conflict 
economies also claim that investors and private business can play a role in preventing 
a relapse into conflict. This thesis will critically examine such claims by questioning 
whether or not investment in the cocoa value chain has a positive impact on 
reconciliation in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. By focusing on the development after the 
country’s 2011 crisis, the thesis will analyse the four capitalist peace assumptions, 
namely the transformative power of capitalist markets, their conditional effect with 
democracy, the protection of contracts and the signalling towards investors, and see 
whether investment activities in the cocoa sector have had a positive impact on 
reconciliation. In addition to the abovementioned will this thesis examine the 
involvement of private chocolate businesses and NGO networks and their impact on 
job creation, the improvement of livelihoods and the re-integration of former 
combatants.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
!
The economic conditions of individuals and the natural resources of nation states have 
been widely analysed in conflict studies and contributed to a vast body of literature 
examining the role of diamonds, cocoa, timber, oil and other resources as causes of 
war (see Collier 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Ross 2004; Basedau & Lay 2009; 
Jensen 2004; Yang 2009). While most claim that there are economic agendas behind 
wars, an emerging part of the literature further argues that economic liberalisation 
might reduce the likelihood of war. Supporters of this so-called capitalist peace theory 
(see Gartzke & Hewitt 2013; Mousseau 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch 2013) argue for 
the importance of trade, globalisation and market values in peace-building efforts. And 
advocates of the economic post-conflict management (Iff et al. 2012; Prandi et al. 
2013; Bray 2010) argue that investors and private business can play an important role 
in preventing a relapse into conflict.  
In this thesis I will critically examine these claims by questioning whether 
investment in the cocoa value chain has a positive impact on reconciliation in post-
conflict Côte d’Ivoire.1 Focusing on the development after the country’s 2011 election 
crisis, I will analyse the four capitalist peace assumptions, namely the transformative 
power of capitalist markets, their conditional effect with democracy, the protection of 
contracts and the signalling towards investors, and see whether investment activities in 
the cocoa sector have had a positive impact on reconciliation. In addition to this, I will 
question to what extent the involvement of private chocolate businesses and NGO 
networks have actually had an impact on the creation of jobs, the improvement of 
livelihoods and the re-integration of former combatants.   
The topic is not only interesting due to the upcoming presidential elections in 
2015,2 but can add another case study for the critical evaluation of the capitalist peace 
literature as well as offering additional explanations from the economic peace-building 
theory.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Positive impact would mean in this context that the investment activity contributes to peace-building 
and could therefore (in part) prevent a relapse into conflict.  
2 The presidential election scheduled for October 2015 is the first one after the heavily contested 
presidential election in 2011, which eventually led to the collapse of the Gbagbo regime. 
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In order to explain my research question, I will first assess some central aspects and 
empirical evidence on economic development in post-conflict countries before 
reviewing the Ivorian conflict history. Thereafter I will present my theoretical and 
methodological framework.   
1.1 Post-conflict development – Why think about it? 
!
How are investment and global capital connected to reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire? 
De Soysa et al. (2012) argue that “all too often (…) post-conflict peace-building 
efforts are designed to remove societal grievances, rather than to promote markets by 
removing the risks of investing” (ibid., p.6). In other words, they claim that there is too 
little focus on (private) investment in actual post-conflict reconciliation. The 
importance of investment in rebuilding a country is reviewed by Ramsbotham et al 
(2011), who emphasise the significance of economic development during post-conflict 
reconstruction. Some argue the that this is necessary in order to prevent “spoilers of 
peace” in the shape of ex-combatants or other actors profiting more from war than 
peace (see Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.216; Kingma 1997).3 Understanding economic 
motivations in conflict helps in shaping a vision for the future and creates possibilities 
for the population to see their share of the peace dividend, as highlighted by 
Wennmann (2011). The integration of former combatants into civil life offers job 
opportunities and revenues and is a crucial contribution to normalization (World Bank 
2011; Bøås & Hatløy 2008; Subedi 2014; Batmanglich & Enria 2014; Gilligan et al. 
2013).4  
 The rebuilding of the agriculture sector is seen as an essential factor for this 
economic reconstruction (see Hårsmar 2010; Binns & Maconachie 2005; Alinovi et al. 
2007; Ismail 2008). Gleditsch et al (1999) stress that “the rehabilitation of agriculture 
is a central condition for development, reducing poverty, preventing environmental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The literature further suggests that the creation of livelihood and jobs are crucial if conflict resolution 
should succeed; due to the fact that “dire poverty, on-going ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the 
proliferation of arms, weak government structure and ravaged infrastructure pose tremendous threats 
that can easily lead a country back into war” (Maponga & Foumbi 2012, p.47). 
4 “The phase 2 need is, first, to absorb enough of those previously employed in disbanded militia as 
will reduce disaffection to containable levels and, second, more generally, for there to be a sense that, 
however difficult and indeed miserable material conditions may be now, there is sufficient evidence of 
likely future improvement - particularly in employment prospects” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220). 
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destruction, and for reducing violence” (1999, p.15). Grossmann et al (2009) underline 
the importance of small-scale farming as a stabilising aspect due to its income-
generating and employment possibilities (ibid., p.61). In their assessment of an 
agricultural training for at-risk youth in Liberia, Blattman and Annan (2011) discover 
high engagement and interest in agriculture amongst former child soldiers. While the 
program did not prevent ex-combatants from totally engaging in illicit activities the 
participants did manage to improve their livelihoods considerably. 
Another aspect of economic post-conflict development is the influx of 
investment in infrastructure and local entrepreneurship (Krech 2009; Bray 2010). 
Investment and innovation in value chains offer high returns for foreign firms, as 
Ouma and Withfield (2012) claim, whilst being considered vital for broad 
development and tension-reduction in fragile contexts. Tobias and Boudreaux (2009) 
illustrate how the increased innovation in the Rwandan coffee sector intensified the 
contact between the different ethnic groups and therefore amplified reconciliation. The 
positive effect on social cohesion between ethnic groups and ex-combatants is often 
reviewed as an incentive to invest in value chains (Grossmann et al. 2009, p.55 ff).  
So far it seems as if investment in an agricultural cash crop such as cocoa has 
been a neglected aspect in the capitalist peace and post-conflict literature, even though 
it might be essential for employment and livelihood generation (see Larsen et al. 2009; 
APP 2014; APP 2012). I would like to contribute to closing this gap in the literature 
with a review of the relatively recent case of Côte d’Ivoire. My thesis could therefore 
add to the understanding of the capitalist peace in the context of cash crop investment 
and its impact on post-conflict reconciliation.  
1.2 Background: Côte d’Ivoire 
!
The case of Côte d’Ivoire is a particularly interesting one, considering the role cocoa 
and its revenues have played historically in financing the country (Losch 2003). Côte 
d’Ivoire proceeded quite peacefully into independence in 1960 after being a French 
colony for 80 years. The first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, installed a one-party 
rule; his Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) guaranteed political stability and 
economic growth in a system based on the boom in agricultural products like cocoa, 
!4 
coffee and cotton (McGovern 2011, p.15 ff.). These cash crops not only secured 
miraculous economic growth, but also contributed to job creation and increased living 
standards for a large part of the population.5 It was a system that was built on the 
expansion of farmland as well as the migration of labour towards the south. It was also 
a system built on customary relationships such as the tutorat, in which first-comers 
(autochthones) concede long-term land rights to migrants (see Chauveau 2006; 
Richards & Chauveau 2007).6 Though partly corrupt, the system arguably had “trickle-
down” effects and improved standards in education and health (see McGovern 2011, 
p.15 ff. Ayangafac 2009). Boigny used his charisma and the country’s economic 
muscles over three decades to keep the Ivorian elite, the military and the majority of 
people content. An consequence of this was that he managed to navigate the deep 
cleavages between the North and the South successfully for many years (Ogwang 
2011). Up until an economic crisis caught up with the country in the late 1980s, which 
instigated pro-democracy movements that put pressure on Boigny’s one-man rule and 
eventually forced him to defend his position in the first multi-party elections in 1990. 
Despite being re-elected, Boigny’s death three years later, left a power vacuum, 
concluding the years of stability and giving way to chaos and uncertainty.  
Following Boigny’s death, Henri Konan Bédie, a Southerner and President of 
the National Assembly, succeeded against the Northerner and Prime Minister Alassane 
Ouattara in the bid for presidency and was elected in 1995. Bédie further introduced 
the concept of “Ivoirité” that differentiated between “real” Ivorians and “foreigners” 
from the northern regions as well as migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. This 
differentiation built on already existing cleavages (Ogwang 2011), but had now been 
appropriated by the political elite in order to not only exclude “Northerners” from 
Ivorian citizenship and deprive non-Ivorians of land rights but also kept Northern 
elitists like Ouattara out of the decision-making processes and gave the people 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Côte d’Ivoire was and still is the largest cocoa exporter worldwide and cocoa represents “on average 
35% of the total value of Ivorian exports, worth around CFA 750 bn per year ($US 1.4bn). Out of a 
total population of 16 million inhabitants, 3 to 4 million people work in the cocoa sector” (Global 
Witness 2007, p.5). 
6  Chauveau and Collin define it as „an agrarian institutional device for regulating relationships 
between first-comers and late-comers. It fits into a moral economy principle that considers that any 
individual or group has a right of access to the means of subsistence for himself and his family“ 
(Chauveau & Colin 2010, p.87). 
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someone to blame for the economic downturn (Langer 2004; Akindès 2004). These 
xenophobic politics led, however, to political crisis and a coup d’état under General 
Robert Guéï in 1999. This is generally considered as the starting point of the period of 
civil war (Peace Direct 2015).  
Laurent Gbagbo, the southern frontmen of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FDI) 
entered the competition against Guéï and declared himself president in 2000.7 Bloody 
clashes and rebellion occurred shortly after, but Gbagbo was able to gain control over 
the country. During his presidency he was able to successfully put his Bété followers 
into essential positions, especially in the cocoa sector (McGovern 2011). Another coup 
d’état attempt by exiled soldiers however increased instability and created an 
insurgency in 2002. As the situation escalated, it eventually caused the employment of 
French military support, and required French-brokered peace talks (e.g. Linas-
Marcoussis, Accra III, Pretoria agreements) in addition to the establishment of a buffer 
zone between the North and South, the “zone de confiance”. Regardless of all the 
peace agreements in place, the situation deteriorated and the destruction, fighting and 
killing of combatants and civilians continued until the Ouagadougou agreement in 
2007.  
In the aftermath of the Ouagadougou talks, presidential elections were 
postponed several times, but were eventually held in 2010. Ouattara, finally being 
declared an eligible candidate, went into the race as candidate for the Rassemblement 
des Républicans (RDR). The election ended in a run-off between Gbagbo and Ouattara 
in November 2010 in which Ouattara was eventually declared the winner with 54.1% 
of the votes over Gbagbo’s 45.9%. Gbagbo, however, was unwilling to surrender 
power and created an impasse between his troops and Ouattara’s FN fighters. Only 
through the support of the UN and the French military was Ouattara finally able to 
claim his presidency after his forces succeeded in storming Gbagbo’s residence in 
April 2011. The new government eventually supported the International Criminal 
Court with the indictment and transfer of Gbagbo to The Hague (see Bah 2012; Bøås 
& Dunn 2013).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 A rather suspicious Supreme Court ruling ruled both Ouattara and Bédie out from participating in the 
election, declaring them non-eligible. 
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There are a number of explanations for the Ivorian conflict, which I will come back to 
in Chapter 3. Some argue that ethnic-induced grievances and the autochthony debates 
formed the background for the conflict (Bøås & Dunn 2013; Lund 2011; Chauveau & 
Richards 2008; Chauveau 2006; Bax 2003). Others take a neo-Malthusian approach 
arguing that land and resource scarcity created the dispute (see Kahl 2006b; Furlong et 
al. 2006; Le Billion 2001). Others explain the insurgency with theories of greed and 
rent-seeking (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Ryan 2011; Woods 2003; Alongi 2011; Global 
Witness 2007). McGovern (2011) argues against an “either/or” causal explanation ( 
ibid., p.174), because the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is such a multi-layered case that 
cannot be explained with a single reason. It is important to understand this complex 
conflict background in order to see possible implications for the post-conflict 
management approach and the analytical framework.  
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
!
In order to explain and analyse the peace-building situation in Côte d’Ivoire, I use 
different aspects of both the capitalist peace literature as well as the liberal peace-
building approach, which I will briefly lay out here and continue to discuss in Chapter 
2.  
Moving along the path of Kant and others, Russett and Oneal (2001) re-
formulated the liberal peace theory for modern inter-state conflict, by claiming that 
liberalisation of trade, international organisations and democracy has a pacifying 
effect. Empirical evidence is diverse but establishes the liberal peace idea as one of the 
few laws in conflict studies. Polackek et al (1999) find for example that free trade with 
large states decreases the likelihood of inter-state conflict. While Mousseau (2000) 
argues that market prosperity supports the development of democratic norms and the 
evolution of democratic institutions, Hegre (2005) sees strong support for the 
international peace theory both internationally as well as domestically.  
Gartzke (2007) distinguishes between the political and economical liberal peace 
theories, the former one being the so-called “democratic peace” and the latter one 
titled as the “capitalist peace” theory. Because the capitalist peace is a rather new 
branch of theory, the literature does not yet offer a coherent set of assumptions. 
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Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) however argue that four mechanisms can explain the 
pacifying effect of capitalism: its transformation of human behaviour, its power 
combined with democratic rule, its ability to protect contracts and property rights and 
its power to signal towards investors (ibid., p.1 ff). I will return to these four 
arguments in the theory chapter. According to the supporters of this theory, studies 
find not only proof that international conflict likelihood is lessened by trade and 
globalization, but also argue that economic freedom and openness towards globalised 
markets decreases the risk for civil wars (see De Soysa & Fjelde 2010, p.288; 
Mousseau 2012; Bussmann et al. 2005).  
“Capitalist peace” is an interesting theory because it gives a voice to economists 
in peace-making, which seem to be increasingly important. But while economic 
motivations and explanations are the name of the game for many, capitalist peace 
theory also faces serious critique. Some argue that warlords already participate in the 
globalised markets and that trading with them increases the revenues available for 
insurgency (Willett 2005). Others assess that the theory’s assumption of a Western 
hegemonic state with a highly codified legal systems is invalid for the African context. 
The “modern state” has been taken over by big men and clientelistic networks, which 
devaluates the Western-based paradigm of the capitalist peace (Taylor 2007). Others 
claim that the capitalist peace serves as an explanation in order to capture high-return 
and untouched markets of the developing countries, but does not increase 
reconciliation (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2007; Moore 2000).  
I believe that these critical remarks about capitalist peace make it even more 
interesting to see how and to what extent the Ivorian case can be explained by the 
theory. While I recognise that the theory might have some limitations, I do think that it 
makes sense to include three parameters from the post-conflict management literature. 
By enquiring whether private capital is able to positively influence job creation, 
livelihood improvement and integration of ex-combatants, one might be able to reflect 
more broadly on the influence of investment in post-conflict countries (see Iff et al. 
2012; Bray 2010).  
In the following thesis I will analyse the capitalist peace critically by using the 
case of post-2011 Côte d’Ivoire. I employ a slightly eclectic framework, using both 
!8 
capitalist peace as well as literature on private and non-governmental actors in peace-
building. By acknowledging some of the “messiness of particular real-world 
situations” (Sil & Katzenstein 2010a, p.142), which cannot be explained by one theory 
alone, I want to include a broader political-economic framework for the Ivorian case. 
The framework I use is therefore two-fold: Firstly I want to critically review the 
capitalist peace theory for the case of investment in Côte d’Ivoire. Since it is a cross-
sectional and causal theory, I assume that it will not be able to explain all the possible 
mechanisms of how investment might have a pacifying effect. Secondly, I draw in 
post-conflict management literature to look into some of the possible additions to the 
capitalist peace framework. I use this two-fold approach to effectively discuss the roles 
(non-) governmental and private capital might play in the post-conflict economy. 
!
Figure 1 Theoretical framework 
 
I will first question some aspects of the capitalist peace theory on the national level: 
Does investment lead to a change in behaviour? Do capitalist markets only have a 
pacifiyng effect under the conditions of democracy and high human development? Is 
the capitalist framework able to explain property rights protection and is there an 
increase in accountability and transparency?  
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Thereafter I will review three aspects in which private companies, the international 
community and non-governmental actors might have an impact at the local level, 
namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of livelihood.   
1.4 Operationalisation and methodological considerations 
!
In the following section I will define the main variables of my theoretical framework 
as well as reviewing the methods that I use in order to evaluate my research question.  
My main variables are defined thus: 
• When referring to Investment, I mean projects that are funded by chocolate 
manufacturers/exporters in cooperation with donors, organisations and the 
government. It is difficult to differentiate single actors in cocoa investment due 
to the network structure (Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015).8  
• In the first analysis chapter I will analyse the assumptions of the capitalist peace 
in the following ways: Firstly, by transformative power of the capitalist peace 
theory, which claims that the involvement in globalised markets change values 
towards focusing more on exchange, individual choice, free will, compromise 
etc. (see Mousseau 2000, p.479). A second conditional effect of capitalist 
peace should be apparent in combination with democratic political framework 
and high levels of human development. Thirdly whether property and 
contract rights should be more strictly protected in the capitalist framework. A 
fourth aspect is the number of accountability and transparency measures that 
are apparent in the cocoa sector. The capitalist peace argument would imply 
that these increase.  
• I will also review the re-integration of combatants, seeking to identify whether 
former fighters have been employed on cocoa plantations. Job creation 
measures general possibilities of employment in the cocoa sector, while 
improvement of livelihoods considers if the perceptions of cocoa farmers’ 
livelihood have become better or worse.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 They refer to business and NGO networks’ involvement that are “based on the idea of market-based 
collective action serving public interests as well as private interests” (Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015, 
p.356).    
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• Reconciliation will be taken up both in terms of social as well as economic 
cohesion. The former being understood as “restoring broken relationships and 
learning to live non-violently with radical differences” (Ramsbotham et al. 
2011, p.246). The latter concludes that former enemies have equally positive 
perceptions of their economic opportunities (see Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; 
Humphreys & Weinstein 2015). I will further reflect on the de-escalation model 
by Ramsbotham et al (2011). 
In addition to the two-fold theoretical structure, I use multiple analytical tools in order 
to evaluate the capitalist peace theory and the peace-building literature, on which I 
want to briefly reflect because it might have some implications for the understanding 
of the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. I first assess my research question in a larger 
capitalist peace framework, using statistics, news reports, expert interviews and other 
national data. Thereafter I review the social realities on a smaller scale by using 
regional statistics and reports as well as focus group interviews.  
In order to get access to data and conduct the expert and focus group interviews, 
I went on a five-week fieldwork trip from January to February 2015 both in Abidjan 
and Gagnoa. I also collected the material that I used to geo-reference the investment 
projects during this period. Based on this fieldwork information and online data, I 
mapped investment sites in Côte d’Ivoire in ArcGIS in order to see possible overlaps 
between conflict and the investment locations.9 The attached overview (see Annex 3) 
shows the different projects, which are private, governmental and non-governmental 
and count 140 locations. One major caveat for the geo-referencing is the lack of 
support from cocoa exporters, organisations and chocolate manufacturers in the data 
collection and while I will return to this issue in Chapter 4, it is important to underline 
that this challenge have also had some methodological implications: Throughout my 
fieldwork and in my 11 expert interviews my aim was to get information on the actual 
investment locations referred to by these experts. In addition, I followed up and 
contacted 35 of the 110 World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) members as well as seven 
NGOs involved in investment projects in Côte d’Ivoire. I received very few responses, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 ArcGIS from Esri is a geographical information system (GIS) that uses maps and GIS-formatted 
datasets; it can be used as a tool for the creation of individualised maps.  
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however, and almost no concrete locations. This lack of access to information is a 
serious shortcoming of the geo-referencing mapping and might indicate a bias in the 
results.   
Based on the data I obtained, I cross-referenced the project locations with two 
different conflict datasets in order to see some correlations. The first source of data 
was the social conflict analysis database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) that accounts 
for small-scale incidents such as riots, protests and strikes in the period of 1990-2013. 
These are geo-referenced and can therefore be mapped in ArcGIS as well. The second 
source is the Uppsala geo-referenced event dataset (UCDP-GED) (Sundberg et al. 
2010) and locates sites of organized violence, armed conflict, non-state violence or 
one-sided violence, between 1989 and 2010. Although the data set does not include the 
five months of the crisis in 2011, it outlines the biggest conflict sites until the end of 
the presidential election between Gbagbo and Ouattara. Through the two databases I 
have a general overview of the most conflict-affected areas in relation to those that are 
most targeted by investment.  
Another data source I used was the Afrobarometer survey (Penar & Mukana 
2013) from Côte d’Ivoire in 2013. The survey of 1200 households offers a broad 
overview of questions on economic, social and political opinions in the country. I used 
the dataset in STATA to both re-run the national results for interesting issues, 
comparing questions along the different regions to see if there are any major 
geographical trends. I further created a sub-sample for the Fromager region, which 
counted only 40 households. As shown in the attached do-file, I used simple tabulation 
commands and only cross-tabulated relevant questions on reconciliation with 
geographical region and perceptions of the economic situation. Both the national and 
regional samples could be criticised for not being representative. Afrobarometer is 
however the only available source for public opinion and is used in combination with 
other sources.  
One of the other main sources I use for the analysis are “qualitative or in-depth 
interviews” (Bryman 2008, p.438) that I conducted with experts in the field of cocoa 
and reconciliation as well as cocoa farmer focus groups. It is not only the most time- 
and cost-effective method of data collection, but it also offers a more specific focus on 
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the research question, while 
giving opportunities for 
reconstruction of events as a 
greater breadth of issues 
covered (Bryman 2008, p.467 
ff). I selected my interview 
partners for the expert 
interviews based on their 
importance in the sector, 
which of course is relative and 
may be biased. I wanted to get 
a broad overview of industrial, 
governmental and foreign organisational experts. Based on the recent sector study by 
Hatløy et al (2012), I got a first overview of the involved organisations. Figure 2 
shows the different levels of actors involved in the sector and I wanted to cover at least 
some of the main program owners, such as TechnoServe, the WCF or the German 
Development Agency (GIZ), parts of the industry and implementers, such as the 
Agricultural Research Centre (CNRA) or the Agency for Rural Support (ANADER) 
named in the study. Based on that study, I contacted possible experts to arrange 
interviews. After I entered the social network of expats in Abidjan, I was able to 
contact even more experts and was referred to more key players. I conducted 11 
formal expert interviews in total, but also received some nuanced feedback through 
informal conversations and my field experience in general. Conducting the expert 
interviews, I used a semi-structured interview guide that I adjusted depending on the 
expert’s organisation and special fields of cocoa engagement and reconciliation. The 
sampled experts are by no means exhaustive, but I still felt that after talking to some of 
the different experts that I heard many of the same themes, and therefore achieved 
something of a “theoretical saturation” (Bryman 2008, p.459 ff) which enabled me to 
answer my research question.  
I also conducted five focus group discussions in cocoa co-operatives in 
Fromager. This region was heavily affected by the civil war but was also targeted by 
Figure 2 Sector overview by Hatløy et al (2012) 
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investment projects, as can be seen in the geo-referencing of both investment and 
violence in Chapter 4. In order to look more closely into the local perceptions of 
communities, I conducted three focus group discussions in co-operatives that received 
investment and two in cooperatives that did not.10 I was assuming that the co-
operatives might have different perspectives on reconciliation depending on whether 
they received the training programme or not. I was further able to talk to some other 
co-operative members in Wanéwa and Bayota (see Annex 1). The groups were equally 
large and contained mainly male cocoa planters, between 35 and 50 years. I was able 
to talk to members of a female co-operative, which helped in getting a broader range 
of characteristics. However Wanéwa is one of the few places in Fromager that has a 
female co-operative and it was therefore not possible to have an equivalent interview 
session with women that did not receive investment.11  
In order to choose my focus groups I contacted ANADER, one of the 
implementers of projects from WCF, the GIZ, TechnoServe and private partners. The 
private sector was, as I previously indicated, not too keen on cooperation considering 
their project locations. But in order to have the oversight of an implementing partner, I 
needed an institution with a wide reach and overview, which the local ANADER 
agents had. The two local staff members in Gagnoa checked their lists of co-operatives 
in the region and helped me to contact them. This kind of selection process is not a 
fully randomized one and therefore there might be a bias towards certain co-operatives 
with whom the ANADER-agents had an interest in working, or already had good 
working relations. Another possible bias might steam from expectations of participants 
in investment communities towards me coming there as an ANADER agent by proxy. 
During the interviews I was made aware that the cooperatives we eventually ended up 
with might have been ethnically segregated, with the treatment category largely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Some might argue that this is methodologically related to a quasi-experimental approach as 
described by Posner (2004). This should increase both validity and reliability of the community 
results.  
11 My informants in Gagnoa (and in Abidjan) mentioned that the female cocoa farmers and plantation 
owners are mainly concentrated in the area around Abengourou, where they are considered as 
“husband-killers” in order to get their spouse’s cocoa plantation.  
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containing autochthones and the non-treatment category over representing 
allochthones from non-Bété communities, an aspect that I will return to later on. 12  
My interpreter moderated all five focus group interviews and we had a number 
of meetings before we travelled to Gagnoa so she was aware of my research project 
and reviewed the questions that I developed. Due to her (cultural) understanding and 
social awareness, she suggested some changes in the wording and framing of the 
different topics in order to get people to answer as freely as possible. When conducting 
the sessions, that we recorded and later transcribed together, she followed the 
interview guide, sometimes switching questions, translating simultaneously and 
adding questions she or I had in order to understand the group’s responses. The 
general outline of topics and questions however remained the same throughout the 
interviews.13 This outline (see Annex 1) contains three sets of questions: The first 
section included easy-to-access topics of work possibilities and alternative jobs in the 
community. Thereafter it moved towards asking about issues of yield increase and 
income in order to assess how the situation evolved in terms of livelihood. The last 
(and definitely the most sensitive) section reviewed the perceived inclusion of ex-
combatants and thoughts on the state of reconciliation.  
I already mentioned a number of possible biases, that I want to draw attention 
to. First and foremost, I already mentioned a possible bias in the geo-referenced 
investment overview due to the difficulties in getting access to data. The information 
that I eventually mapped is limited and likely over-represents investment with a social 
infrastructure focus. My data contains relative little information on projects aimed at 
productivity levels, which is a considerable caveat.  
Another possible selection bias lies in the choice of experts and co-operatives 
for the interviews. Especially with regards to the focus group interviews my results 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The informants referred to their ethnic affiliation/ group with the French term of “communauté”, 
which translates only poorly into “community”.  
13 All interviews contained a proper formal and local presentation of both of us, as well as my research 
project, to the participants. Our main contacts in most of the co-operatives were the chairmen or 
leaders of the co-operative, which as is custom dictates “translated” us; meaning that he/ she 
introduced us first, then we introduced ourselves again. When we were finished and gave thanks, the 
contact person repeated the content. This aspect may be critical, since it could establish a potential 
bias, as well as representing a possibility for us to gain great credibility amongst the respondents. In 
addition, we communicated the rules for the group sessions, ensuring anonymity as well as valuing all 
input.  
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might be biased by the choice of investment project, ethnic composition and non-
randomness. Further biases might relate to my gender, the gender of my interpreter, 
our young age, her ethnic affiliation as well as my skin colour. I got the impression 
that most of the participants were relatively open towards us. They did not seem 
threatened by us and opened up because as they said to us, they appreciated having 
their opinions heard.  
A possible source of bias might further arise from the capitalist peace theory 
logic in itself. A number of researchers (see Schneider 2014; DiGiuseppe et al. 2012; 
De Soysa & Vadlammanati 2013) mention that the proposed relationship between 
involvement in global capital markets and peace suffers from endogeneity. This means 
that there might be a reversed causality between investment and reconciliation or that 
the results are driven by factors that are not included. I tried to mitigate some of these 
possible biases by methodologically triangulating the results and discussing problems 
of the theoretical endogeneity underway.  
By using a multitude of data sources, both quantitatively and qualitatively and 
by critically discussing possible biases I can argue that my data material is quite sound 
and can effectively be used to draw some preliminary conclusions (see Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie 2004; Lieberman 2005; Feilzer 2009). However, it is important to 
outline what this thesis cannot offer. I am not attempting to evaluate programme 
results or assessing national reconciliation programme efforts. I do not offer a sector 
study with all actors involved in cocoa farming, since there are so many that it would 
be impossible to reach out to all of them in a master-level thesis. The network-
characteristic of the cocoa investment also makes it difficult to aggregate individual 
actors’ effects on the reconciliation process. What this thesis can offer is a case study 
based on qualitative and quantitative methods; that tries to evaluate some aspects of 
the very broad capitalist peace literature and liberal peace-building agenda in the 
context of Côte d’Ivoire. It can be useful as an example that critically assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses in the capitalist approach and points to some aspects that I 
deem important to include in order to evaluate business involvement in fragile 
contexts.  
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1.5 Thesis structure 
 
Following this introduction, my next chapter will go into more detail on the theoretical 
framework that I use. By first explaining the eclectic approach to theories fronted by 
Sil and Katzenstein (2010b), I will argue that using two frameworks might be useful to 
answer a real life research question. Thereafter I will outline liberal peace theory and 
capitalist peace and discuss critics of those theories. I will then refer to some post-
conflict management views which argue that investment might be able to create jobs, 
reintegrate combatants and improved livelihood. This chapter will conclude by 
reviewing the term “reconciliation” and presenting my conceptual framework.  
In the third chapter, I will present more of the background and go into more 
detail on the history and reasons for the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire as well as accounting 
for the country’s system of landownership. To conclude, I will briefly review the 
cocoa value chain in general before referring to the country-specific features of the 
Ivorian cocoa industry.  
 My nation-level analysis in Chapter 4 begins with a short introduction to the 
main investment actors in Côte d’Ivoire and the results from investment and conflict 
mapping. I thereafter discuss the state of reconciliation in general before reviewing the 
four main assumptions of the capitalist peace theory.  
Chapter 5 will deal with the micro-level and the individual perspective. Here I 
will use both qualitative and quantitative measures to establish an overview over the 
case region Fromager before putting the results of the four focus group discussions up 
for comparison. 
The conclusion follows in Chapter 6 which divided into three parts. The first 
part compares the macro and micro-level evidence and the second reviews the most 
important points of my theory, the case country and need for further research. The 
third part makes on recommendations.  
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Chapter 2. Theory  
!
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis has a two-fold theoretical approach due to the 
complexity of the conflict (see O'Bannon 2012) as well as the focus of the theories. I 
will therefore first give a brief overview of the eclectic manner in which I use theories. 
Subsequently I will outline arguments and assumptions of the capitalist peace theory 
before reviewing literature on non-governmental and private actors in post-conflict 
management in more detail.  
2.1 Making theories useful -Analytic eclecticism    
!
Though most of the theory I use might be summarised under the larger heading of the 
liberal peace, I am not dealing with the whole theory. Instead I review one of its sub-
theories critically and as I assume gaps in explaining the case of Côte d’Ivoire, I 
include parts of the peace-building literature. I argue that political science is no longer 
adequate in explaining what is its object (Shapiro 2005, p.2) but is instead limited by 
adhering to one theoretical paradigm. Studying the actual results of political science 
often reveals that global black and white theories are no longer able to explain the 
“messiness of the real world”. These challenges are however no reason to ignore 
theoretical assumptions completely because “theory is unavoidable” (Nye & Welch 
2011 p.ix). My main point is that in order to acknowledge the complexity of reality 
without downsizing it to one specific theory, one needs to use broader and different 
theoretical frameworks.  
Sil and Katzenstein (2010b; 2010a) are amongst those who argue to use 
paradigms in a more pragmatic manner, the so-called analytical eclecticism. 
“Analytical eclecticism is about making intellectually and practically useful 
connections among clusters of analyses that are substantively related but normally 
formulated in separate paradigms” (ibid., p.2). Without getting into an epistemological 
debate about the sense and nonsense of assumptions in social sciences, I will briefly 
present their take using theories in the real world. Sil and Katzenstein see the need to 
integrate observations and causal stories from different paradigms and theoretical 
narratives in order to explain problems meaningfully (ibid. 2010b, p.3). Their main 
argument here is to use so-called “points of convergence” (ibid., p.34) from the 
!18 
different theories and combine paradigms in that way.14 For example, the invasion of 
the Bush government in Iraq can be explained by combining assumptions from the 
realist and the liberal paradigm by using arguments close to paradigms’ convergence 
points.15  
Claiming that most paradigms are too quick to simplify reality, their approach 
“seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate (…) narratives that have been 
developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive 
problems” (ibid., p.10).16 They acknowledge challenges to their approach; for example 
the problem of theory-comparison across cases as well as problems occurring from 
two paradigms with incompatible perspectives, like the school of capitalist peace and 
the more policy-oriented peace-building literature. They argue however that 
eclecticism still makes sense since one rarely refers to one theoretical paradigm as a 
whole anyway (ibid., p.18 ff).  
 I use here a reduced eclectic framework in order to review the complex yet 
substantive problem of investment in fragile contexts. Firstly, I evaluate assumptions 
of capitalist peace theory by referring to the Ivorian case. Assuming that these 
assumptions are problematic in explaining all relevant aspects of the post-conflict 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire, I refer to elements of post-conflict management literature in 
the second part of my analysis. I use such an eclectic approach due to capitalist peace 
theory being a more static and macro-oriented theory, while the post-conflict literature 
focuses on the individual perspective.17   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 They argue that “eclectic scholarship is designed to highlight the substantive intersections and 
practical relevance of theories originally constructed within separate paradigms” (Sil & Katzenstein 
2010b, p.35). 
15 Realist assumptions might be found in the extensive and aggressive defence character of the 
invasion, while liberalist arguments can be seen in the missionary neo-conservative attitude of 
“exporting” democracy around the world. 
16 “An eclectic approach also assumes the existence of complex interactions among the distribution of 
material capabilities (typically emphasized in realism), the gains pursued by self-interested individuals 
and collective actors (typically emphasized by liberals), and the role of ideas, norms, and identities in 
framing actors' understanding of the world and of their role within it (privileged by 
constructivists)”(Sil & Katzenstein 2010b, p.37). 
17 One can hardly argue that the way in which a single community is entrenched in the globalised 
markets is decisive in that communities’ social cohesion. One could however argue that the way in 
which a certain investment-friendliness breaks down to local indicators like jobs and livelihood 
standards has a real impact on the social peace.  
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2.2 Capitalist Peace theory 
!
The idea of liberal peace has a long tradition and is established as one of the few “laws 
of nature” in the discipline (see Mazower 2012; Nye & Welch 2011; Ramsbotham et 
al. 2011). Most recently the liberal peace has explained as the “tripod of peace” by 
Russett and Oneal (2001). They argue that increased international trade, global 
organisations and cooperation as well as democracy are the three crucial ingredients 
for peace. A large number of empirical studies have followed, testing the theory for 
different periods and country samples (see Oneal et al. 1996; Spiro 1994; Doyle 2005; 
Oneal & Russett 1999). 
 This thesis is not concerned with the grand liberal peace, but rather in its 
economic component outlined by Gartzke and Hewitt (2013). They argue that 
liberalism contains two schools, “one emphasizing representative government and 
international deliberative bodies and the other advocating global markets and 
economic development” (ibid., p.11), namely the economic and the political liberal 
tradition. Though they underline that economic liberalism received less attention, 
Weede (1992) has already argued for a connection between free-trading markets, 
development and peace. He is therefore considered to be one of the capitalist peace’s 
founding fathers (Schneider & Gleditsch 2013; Mousseau 2010; Weede 2005).18  
2.2.1 Three shades of the capitalist peace 
!
Traditionally, capitalist peace researchers focus on trade relations and their pacifying 
impact (see Mousseau 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch 2013). Hegre (2005) outlines for 
example that the trade of manufactured goods creates interdependencies which in turn 
reduce the likelihood of interstate dispute. He argues that business interests influence 
the foreign policy of a country on such a scale, regardless of the political system, that 
it makes it less reasonable to fight (ibid., p.31). Polackek, Robst and Chang (1999) 
claim that smaller states can reduce the chances of conflict by trading with larger 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Some of the older articles reviewed here are labelled as ‘economic liberalism’. I however argue that 
Gartzke and Hewitt’s (2013) open up to the assumption that all of the economic liberal peace literature 
can be summarized under the term of ‘capitalist peace’ theory, since all of them review the impact of 
trade, globalisation and free-markets upon peace.   
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states (ibid., p.15). Rosencrance (2010) argues that industrialisation and the change in 
production mode had a pacifying effect. 
 A second aspect of the capitalist peace is the focus on economic freedom and 
openness. De Soysa (2012) claims that “those who invest money wish to avoid war 
because violence would disrupt profits” (ibid., p.4). Greed literature further assumes 
that rebellion is costly and needs to be waged against peace-time economics. Therefore 
some argue that increased economic freedom offers larger profits from peace and 
makes war less reasonable.19 De Soysa (2012) measures economic freedom via the 
Fraser Institute indicator which includes two aspects: the freedom of business from 
state interference and the support of private business by impartial institutions (ibid., 
p.10). He finds not only that economic freedom has a pacifying effect, it is also more 
important than political liberalisation and democratisation. De Soysa and 
Vadlammanti (2013) take up the positive relationship between free markets, economic 
reforms and human rights violations.20 Their main argument is that free markets “help 
disperse economic resources, allowing those with economic power to offset the 
influence of those with political power” (ibid., p.165). Mousseau (2010; 2000) argues 
for the importance of market norms in capitalist peace. Norms such as individual 
choice, free will, negotiation and compliance are values that are said to have a positive 
effect on the establishment of democratic norms and peace (2000, p.474).  
A third aspect of the capitalist peace comes involves the pacifying effect of 
globalisation. Gartzke and Hewitt (2013) argue that this is due to three reasons: First, 
because modern modes of production raise the costs of coercion, making it cheaper to 
trade than to steal. Second, that critical aspects in the international system are no 
longer debated due to a homogenisation amongst trading partners. Third, that leaders 
of globalized countries bluff less often about war and have more credibility (ibid., 
p.12). While globalisation in itself is recognized to decrease conflict likelihood (Flaten 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 “In other words, economic freedom matters: more open markets dampen the fear and mistrust 
associated with ethnic nepotism. This suggests in turn that the primary concern of ethnic groups might 
be economic, rather than political well-being”(De Soysa 2012, p.4).  
20 “Economic reforms are usually wide-ranging changes to the existing regulatory, institutional and 
structural make up of the economy, and are aimed at increasing economic efficiency by promoting the 
privatization of markets, free competition and the strengthening of property rights” (De Soysa & 
Vadlammanati 2013, p.165). 
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& De Soysa 2012; Bussmann & Schneider 2007; Bennett 2014a), globalisation shocks 
do have a conflict-increasing effect, as Nieman (2011) points out.  
The above-mentioned arguments largely look at international disputes. As the 
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is a civil war, can I then use it to evaluate capitalist peace 
theory? I argue that I can, since there is a growing body of literature on the existence 
of domestic capitalist peace as well (see De Soysa 2012; Mousseau 2012; Hegre 2005; 
DiGiuseppe et al. 2012).21 De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) find that economic freedom 
and free markets result in more prosperity and social cooperation and therefore 
decrease civil war (ibid., p.289). Magee and Massoud (2011) find that a rise in trade 
openness leads to a decrease in civil war likelihood. Bussmann et al (2005) find a 
long-term pacifying effect of trade opening. However they argue that in the short-term, 
trade opening might fuel internal conflicts. Similarly Nieman (2011) claims that 
globalisation at large lessens the civil war likelihood, while shocks of globalisation can 
increase the likelihood of civil war. This last explanation might describe the situation 
in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s and 1990s where a decrease in crop prices and an 
intensified liberalisation acted as (external) globalisation shocks.    
2.2.2 Capitalist assumptions  
!
The range of the capitalist peace literature makes it difficult to pin down its main 
assumptions (see Schneider 2014, p.176). But in order to have a framework for 
evaluation I use Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) who offer a overview over four main 
arguments explaining the capitalist peace (ibid., p.3 f.). Firstly, they claim that 
capitalism alters human behaviour and transforms belligerents into traders, consumers 
and businessmen. This is supported by those arguing that market norms aide the 
creation of democratic values and therefore capitalism has a pacifying effect (see De 
Soysa 2012; Mousseau 2000; De Soysa & Vadlammanati 2013). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 “Several contemporary studies report a positive relationship between economic freedom, properly 
functioning markets, and civil peace, and describe a number of different channels through which good 
market institutions, such as respect for property rights, can temper social conflict (…)” (De Soysa 
2012, p.4).  
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The second argument reflects on capitalism being conflict-reducing under certain 
conditions, namely democratically governed and highly developed states.22 This 
second argument is rather ambiguous since many of the proponents argue that markets 
alone can do the trick. Others claim that this explanation is prone to endogeneity, 
arguing that involvement in global markets are responsible, while in fact other aspects 
drive the results.  
Thirdly, they argue that capitalist economies are more active in protecting 
contract and property rights. This makes capitalist countries less likely to get into 
conflicts over property and therefore has a pacifying influence. Mousseau (2010) 
argues that capitalist economies consist of many market-linked actors and that due to 
their power, governments enforce contracts rigorously both internally and externally. 
This in turn causes peace (ibid., pp.188-190).  
The fourth argument is that capitalist economies are able to signal their resolve 
more effective than closed economies. This point is underlined by others (Hegre 2005; 
De Soysa 2012; DiGiuseppe et al. 2012; Gartzke & Hewitt 2013) who claim that states 
involved in the global market experience an increase in accountability and credibility 
because they need to signal to international investors and creditors. For my own 
evaluation of the capitalist peace theory, I will look in a more nuanced manner into 
these four assumptions in Chapter 4.  
2.2.3 Looking at the capitalist peace from a critical angle  
!
As mentioned previously, there are a number of critics towards these capitalist peace 
assumptions. One critique has been that the global players have utilized capitalist 
peace arguments in order to enter “untouched” markets of fragile states. This has been 
supported by MacGinty and Richmond (2007) who argue that capitalist peace 
essentially camouflages Western business interests (ibid., p.493). Though capital 
liberalism is effective in creating quantifiable post-conflict results, such as number of 
rebuilt houses, is it less “effective in managing the affective dimensions of peace – 
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22 “In his [Schumpeter’s] view, the power of the capitalist peace conviction within a country depends 
on the distribution of power between protectionists and the adherents of the market economy who both 
are able to voice their wishes within a democratic setting. Another conditionality argument maintains 
that the pacifying influence of trade grows with the level of development” (Schneider & Gleditsch 
2013, p.3).  
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reconciliation, trust, and inter-communal respect” (ibid., p.497). Moore (2000) argues 
along similar lines:  
“If humanitarian agencies want a piece of the decreasing aid pie, perhaps it is 
understandable that they are deigning to dine with the devil that brews up such 
investment friendly concoctions” (ibid., p.16).  
Moore argues that African wars have been historically waged by global capital without 
empathy or understanding of the local context (ibid., p.21).  
Others criticise capitalist peace for its assumptions about the state. Taylor 
(2007) implies that the theory constructs its argument based on the idea of a 
hegemonic state and is therefore ill-fitted for African context.23 He concludes:  
(Economic liberalism) “in Africa is likely to be hidebound – if not sabotaged – 
by Africa’s well-established governance modalities, such as personal rule, 
clientelism and the unwillingness to engage with nongovernmental 
organisations or expend resources on broad-based development projects” (ibid., 
p.564). 
Willett (2005) similarly claims that capitalist peace ignores African states that have 
been taken over by warlords and local elites (ibid., p.575). One interesting aspect here 
is that global capital already invested heavily and trades with neo-patrimonial African 
leaders.24 Willett therefore argues that capitalism has a negative impact:  
“In this manner, international capital rewards reinforces the indigenous 
structures of violence enhancing militarised solutions to resource disputes that 
often inadvertently undermine international resolution to conflict.” (ibid., 
p.576).  
In short, the capitalist peace theory might lack the global generalisability because it 
assumes a Western state model that is not found universal.25 
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23 “The non-hegemonic nature of much of Africa’s ruling elites means that the relative autonomy of 
the state, which allows reforms, makes autocracy redundant and creates the soil in which liberal 
democracy might be nurtured, is not present” (Taylor 2007, p.560). 
24 “In their struggle for control over strategic assets, warlords have often secured support from 
multinational companies that have a vested interest in maintaining access to profitable natural 
resources” (Willett 2005, p.571). 
25 “Africa urgently needs inward investment, but investments by multinationals have done little to 
enrich African people; on the contrary, all the evidence suggests that it has impoverished them. The 
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A third source of critique against the general nature of capitalist peace lays in the 
Ugandan case study by Shaw and Mbabazi (2007). They state that economic liberals 
cynically allow for a dual economic development, creating vast inequalities throughout 
the country. This so-called “war with peace”, contains one part of the country that is 
peaceful and integrated into global markets, while the other part remains at war. They 
argue that such a “peace” is neither liberal nor sustainable but rather uneven and 
therefore unstable (ibid., p.569). They claim that the case of the “two Ugandas” shows 
that “African capitalism” is very different from the Western concept, which poses 
questions on the generalisability of the capitalist peace argument.26 Looking at these 
critiques, I think it is useful to evaluate the assumptions of the capitalist peace agenda 
with a critical look at the case of Côte d’Ivoire.  
2.3 Reconciliation in capitalist economies 
!
Capitalist peace theory has a very macro-analytical perspective on the cause of peace. 
There are some aspects that this perspective might not be able to cover, but in order to 
evaluate whether investment can have a positive effect, I think it is important to draw 
on literature from post-conflict management. Combining the investment focus with 
peace-building literature is sensible, as De Soysa (2012) already hints towards 
implications of the capitalist peace for peace-building.27 Besada et al (2009) also argue 
for the significance of investment in the peace-building in the Côte d’Ivoire (ibid., 
p.1).  
Ramsbotham et al (2011) review the five main theories of conflict resolution 
and argue that pluralist and cosmopolitan theories are the “heartland of conflict 
resolution” (ibid., p.396 ff). The former argues that the world community exists and 
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history of corporate involvement in Africa is a history of forced labour, evictions, murder, wars, the 
under-costing of resources, tax evasion and collusion with dictators” (Willett 2005, p.582). 
26 “A signal lesson of Uganda’s ‘war with peace’ status is the ability of the liberal peace to tolerate war 
and dislocation in areas adjacent to showcase examples of ‘success’. (…) While democratisation and 
economic liberalisation are encouraged in the south, considerable deviance from this path is tolerated 
in the north. This suggests a cool-headed calculation on behalf of promoters of the liberal peace, 
namely bilateral donors and international financial institutions – and, by proxy, the Ugandan 
government. Northern Ugandan ‘deviance’ maybe deemed acceptable because the area is considered 
to be strategically marginal”(Shaw & Mbabazi 2007, p.578). 
27 “Thus, the peace-building initiatives (…) might have to focus intently on how to build economic 
and political institutions that support economic competition and ensure low barriers to entry for 
legitimate businesses” (De Soysa 2012, p.6). 
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has a responsibility to intervene in order to develop a “human governance”, while the 
latter is more critical towards intervention and the overriding of sovereignty in order to 
protect local culture and economies. The realists, on the other hand, see both other 
theories as utopian and argue that intrastate wars, due to their greed-basis, can be more 
successfully solved via military action. Most articles that argue for private companies’ 
involvement in peace-building as part of a larger framework of peace are somewhat 
rooted in pluralist theory. Some aspects of greed and profit-gains are however part of 
the rational agenda of conflict resolution. In other words, the field of private and non-
governmental involvement in peace-building is not so predefined by the large 
paradigms as the literature on causes of conflict. It is however slightly more policy-
related and in parts more normative.  
The idea that private companies and other non-state actors might impact the 
peace-building and reconciliation is not entirely new. Especially in the stabilisation 
phase, where Côte d’Ivoire is today, economic reconstruction should be the main 
policy priority (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.211). There are a number of authors 
arguing that the economic perspective has been neglected in the peace-building 
approach (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Johnson 2009; Grossmann et al. 2009). This 
economic understanding, which includes non-state and private actors, is important in 
order to evaluate possible peace dividends and long-term stability. Especially when 
looking at West African peace-building (Hutchful & Aning 2004; Johnson 2009) is it 
important to look at the involvement of resources and the private sector in order to 
adequately address post-conflict challenges.  
There are also authors suggesting that private actors might gain some credit 
from consumers if they engage in conflicts, for example as part of their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Bennett (2014b) argues that industries that are directly 
connected to consumers, for example clothing and shoe production, rely on their 
reputation. This makes it more important for them to review their involvement in post-
conflict or fragile contexts. Some (Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015) 
argue for the increasing need for private companies to present “do-good-stories” to 
claim their legitimacy (Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015, p.37), which leads them to 
increasingly engage in networks with NGOs. Others however imply that the ones most 
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directly involved in are small and medium enterprises, since “many multinational 
companies are afraid of the reputational risks of working in conflict-affected 
countries” (Grossmann et al. 2009, p.119). Iff (2012) supports this by highlighting that 
some private actors do not want to lose their neutrality in the countries in which they 
operate, as peace-building is perceived as too political. 
There are three main areas outlined in the literature which non-governmental 
partners and private might impact: job-creation, re-integration of combatants and 
improved livelihoods. I will briefly relay how these three parameters might help in 
explaining the effect of investment in the fragile context.  
2.3.1 Creating jobs in fragile contexts  
!
One of the main tasks of the economic reconstruction is therefore the creation of 
employment prospects and jobs (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220). Besada (2009) 
argues: “Communities cannot prosper unless private investment restores markets and 
generates employment opportunities” (ibid., p.7). The promotion of a business 
environment and support to value chains can also be crucial in order to “build trust and 
foster cooperation for a common goal” (ibid., p.10). Employment across different 
ethnic groups and both sides of a conflict can help not only in creating revenues but 
also to reconcile former enemies in forward-looking activities. The study on 
entrepreneurship in Rwanda’s coffee sector (Tobias & Boudreaux 2009) provides an 
interesting case. It reviews “to what extent (…) commercial enterprises in the post-
conflict Rwandan coffee sector contribute to conflict resolution”(ibid., p.2). The study 
is based on Allport’s intergroup contact theory, which says that more contact between 
different ethnic groups has a positive impact on reconciliation. They also include the 
arguments of the capitalist peace literature, which says substantial gains from peace-
time trade is more important than gains from war.28 Measuring a number of intergroup 
contact features, such as frequency, affect and quality, they find “high degrees of 
ethnic distance reduction and highly frequent social and work-released contact” (ibid., 
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28 “(…) liberalisation of the Rwandan coffee sector triggers psychological processes among coffee 
workers affected by this institutional change that lead to more positive attitudes towards members of 
the other ethnic community in Rwanda” (Tobias & Boudreaux 2009, p.4). 
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p.15). This means that working together in one value chain had a positive effect on the 
post-conflict relations between different conflict groups in Rwanda. 
One sector that is essential here is small-scale agriculture both due to food 
security and providing income and employment for returning refugees and soldiers. 
Richards and Chauveau (2007) argue along similar lines, saying that agriculture is able 
to supply employment for a large number of young people (ibid., p.7). However, they 
caution that this depends on how land institutions are able to integrate them. They 
claim improvements in agriculture such as skill training and land reforms may be 
effective in employing youth (ibid., p.11). Looking at job creation for young men in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, Batmanglich and Enria (2014) link to some topics that are 
interesting for this argument. This study reviews private investment in mining and 
agriculture and how it impacts perceptions of employment and livelihood. They find 
that there is no relationship between investment and job creation in their case 
countries. That is partly due to the fact that the private sector was not involved in the 
planning, programming and implementation of post-conflict job creation.  
 I believe that the issue of job creation, or at least the idea of job creation, should 
be an important aspect in the post-conflict agenda. Investment by private and non-
governmental partners might have a pacifying effect, both due to the increased contact 
between different groups as well as the increased livelihood through jobs.   
2.3.2 Re-integration of combatants  
!
One of the most important tasks in post-conflict states is the integration of former 
fighters into the economics of peace (Kingma 1997). In order to create a civil 
economy, a country’s economy should be able to “absorb enough of those previously 
employed in disbanded militia as will reduce disaffection to containable levels” 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220). Some (Alusala 2011; Grossmann et al. 2009) argue 
that long-term stability is only achieved if skills are developed that diminish the 
incentives for combatants to re-engage in looting or armed blackmail as an easy and 
profitable alternative for young fighters (Alusala 2011, p.108). Investment can play an 
important role in this by supporting vocational training (Besada et al. 2009, p.2), as in 
the case with cocoa investment in Côte d’Ivoire.  
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International Alert (2012) finds that “early engagement with businesses and close 
coordination amongst stakeholders is essential for the positive reception of ex-
combatants into the labour market” (ibid., p.5). The report claims that re-integration of 
combatants not only transforms the individual, but also offers extended benefits for 
peers and the community around the combatants. Similar to the contact-hypothesis by 
Allport (see Tobias & Boudreaux 2009), community bonds might be strengthened 
when ex-combatants are re-integrated into a common work (International Alert 2012, 
p.5). Re-integration into the civil labour market should created a kind of “social 
belonging” both for the communities as well as the combatants (Alusala 2011, p.12). 
Bøås and Hatløy (2008) find that those that joined the rebel troops in Liberia were not 
over-proportionally poor but instead “ordinary people who joined armed groups based 
on various ideas concerning protection and opportunity” (ibid., p.14). This should be 
another argument that re-integration into civil economies might decrease the chance of 
a resurgence of conflict. 
 Lamb (2012) reflects on the mixed results from re-integration into agriculture in 
South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). He argues that some participants found subsistence agriculture 
unappealing (CAR) or difficult to enter because they did not have land rights (CAR & 
DRC). However, integration into farming in South Sudan was considered a great 
success because most of the former fighters received skill training or had some prior 
experience.   
2.3.3 Improving economic livelihood 
!
One of the most important aspects in post-conflict countries is the question of so-
called “peace dividends” (Junne & Verkoren 2009). Arguing that armed violence is 
“not simply a breakdown of a particular system but a way of creating an alternative 
system of profit, power and even protection” (Wennmann 2011, p.11), peace 
economies need to offer improved livelihoods to combatants and non-combatants. 
Looking into income sharing arrangements, Wennmann (2011) underlines that it is 
crucial to craft “an economic vision for a future that ex-combatants and the conflict-
affected populations can start believing” (ibid., p.75). Johnson (2009) explains that it 
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is necessary to promote economic growth that lessens ethnic and regional inequalities 
in order to increase stability.  
 Some state that it is vital to include development agencies and business as 
partners in order to make these peace dividends tangible. Global companies are locally 
involved, and therefore Wennmann (2011) thinks that “private sector can contribute to 
stability, livelihoods, and economic recovery from the bottom-up and directly affects 
the people’s experience of war-to-peace-transitions” (ibid., p.97).29 Grossmann et al 
(2009) argue along the same lines, claiming that business people and bankers are the 
ones that can create such an inclusive growth and  “mitigate the socioeconomic 
exclusion of those who have little or no access to resources, jobs and other 
opportunities” (ibid., p.17).  
However, many outline that even though private investment can provide 
important incentives, companies do not feel that they have the responsibility, the 
information or the political mandate to get involved in conflict resolution (see 
Wennmann 2011, p.101; Iff et al. 2012).30 Bray (2010) is slightly more critical to 
foreign direct investment in fragile states, arguing that the impact assessment often is 
lacking, that wealth-generating activities are often lagging behind, while investors 
might be ‘used’ by local patronage figures involved in the conflict as well as being 
linked to very specific political interests that increases the conflict likelihood (ibid., 
p.9).  
Agriculture is an important factor here as well, as Sikuka (2014) points out.31 
De Soysa et al (1999) argue that rebuilding agriculture is a “central condition for 
development, reducing poverty, preventing environmental destruction, and for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 “These [different forms of support for peace processes, EMN] include building bridges between 
different communities and between the state and society, engaging directly in talks with belligerents, 
providing good offices and information, acting as pro-peace constituencies, paying for peace 
processes, assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, strengthening entrepreneurship, 
building trust, fostering accountability, and limiting access to conflict financing” (Wennmann 2011, 
p.98). 
30 “Many chief executive officers (CEOs) consider that they have no stake in conflict resolution 
because they believe armed conflict is something ‘political’ or something for governments to sort out” 
(ibid., p.101). 
31 “Based on these statistics, it is therefore logical to assume that any improvements in the agricultural 
sector would significantly contribute towards the realisation of many other developmental priorities 
for Africa, such as poverty eradication, industrial expansion and increased interregional trade” (Sikuka 
2014, p.39). 
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reducing violence. Poor conditions for agriculture hold grave implications for (…) 
sustainable peace.” (ibid., p.15). Some (see Berdal & Keen 1997; Collier et al. 2011) 
claim the existence of a “vicious circle of poverty”: Conflict destroys the agriculture 
sector, making it difficult for farmers to survive, which in turn leads to more conflict 
because farmers get higher revenues from engaging in war.32 Therefore they argue that 
agriculture is necessary for peace,33 for example by investing in cash cropping (see 
Chauveau & Richards 2008; Schneider & Gugerty 2011). Others see the need for a 
large-scale “agrarian revolution” in West Africa, due to increased population growth 
and demand for diversified food and agricultural production (see Bossard 2012, p.5; 
Kahl 2006a; Kahl 2006b). An important factor in this change in production modes is 
the investment of the private sector and the change in investment policies by 
governments.34 Other possibilities for agricultural “livelihood recovery” are skills 
development, provision of agricultural input or livestock, micro-credit agricultural 
extension services (ibid., p.70). In order to see if investment, such as skills 
development in cocoa, has an effect on the perceived post-conflict livelihood, I will 
review the differences in perceptions between the communities that received training 
and those that have not.    
2.4 What is reconciliation?  
!
One final aspect is the conceptualisation of reconciliation in order to know what this 
analysis is looking at. Ramsbotham et al (2011) define reconciliation as “restoring 
broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences” (ibid., 
p.246) which is quite difficult to measure. More practical are the four dimensions of 
reconciliation that they disclose. Firstly, the acceptance of the status quo, where 
violence ends and people try to get acquainted with the situation. This is followed by 
the reconciling accounts, where each side compares their stories of the war and 
suffering. The third stage is entitled ‘bridging diversity’ and emphasises mutual 
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32 “Indeed, only five out of 63 states who exhibit a low dependence on agriculture have suffered armed 
conflict after the Cold War” (De Soysa et al. 1999, p.17). 
33 “Without cultivating development—a process highly dependent on favourable conditions for 
agricultural production and rural livelihood—there can be no sustainable peace” (De Soysa et al. 1999, 
p.23). 
34 “Promoting entrepreneurship and agricultural investment ought to be a ‘regional great cause’“ 
(Bossard 2012, p.6). 
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change and the bridging of opposite views. The final stage, which happens not on a 
societal but instead on a personal scale is the reconciliation of former enemies (ibid., 
p.247). In order to evaluate steps taking in reconciliation, Ramsbotham et al present 
aspects of the de-escalation ladder, which are connected to the four meanings of 
reconciliation. The first acceptance stage is particularly difficult in conflicts without a 
decisive victory or defeat.35 In the second stage, violent enemies are “re-humanised” 
again by comparing each other’s sides of the conflict. Thirdly come structural political 
and economic rearrangements that seek to bridge differences between the former foes. 
During the last stage of reconciliation enemies have not only come to terms with each 
others differences but even appreciate them.   
Ramsbotham et al (2011) also refer to alternative paths to reconciliation, by for 
example using truth commissions, war trials, reparations, ritual healing and 
‘indigenous’ peace initiatives as well as retaliation. Amongst those is also the “official 
amnesia”, where societies collectively forget the past violence.36 There are a number 
of articles arguing for some of these alternative processes in Côte d’Ivoire, for 
example by employing a truth and reconciliation commission (Owusu-Sekyere 2009). 
O’Bannan (2012) indicates that Côte d’Ivoire offers a number of examples of such 
ancient or “inherited hatred”. 
2.5 Theoretical framework 
!
So what do these theoretical discussions lead to? They serve first and foremost as a 
backgrond for the theoretical framework. First of all, I want to critically review the 
capitalist peace theory concerning investment in Côte d’Ivoire. Since it is a cross-
sectional and causal theory, I assume that it will not be able to explain all the possible 
mechanisms of how investment might have a pacifying effect. Secondly, I draw on 
post-conflict management literature to look into some of possible additions to the 
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35 “If it is hard to forgive a defeated enemy, and harder to forgive a finally victorious enemy, it is 
harder still to forgive an enemy who is still seen to be an immediate and potent threat” (Ramsbotham 
et al. 2011, p.259). 
36 „So perhaps there are some things best forgotten, such as ‘ancient hatreds’ (…) but others we want 
to remember, such as the memory of the victims and reasons why violence is best prevented (…)” 
(ibid., p.252).
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capitalist peace framework. I use this two-fold approach to effectively discuss the role 
(non-) governmental and private capital might play in the post-conflict economy. 
Therefore I will first question some aspects of the capitalist peace theory on the 
national level: Does investment lead to a change in behaviour? Do capitalist markets 
only have a pacifiyng effect under the conditions of democracy and high human 
development? Is the capitalist framework able to explain property rights protection and 
is there an increase in accountability and transparency?  
 
!
Figure 3 Theoretical framework 
 
Thereafter I will review three aspects in which private companies, the 
international community and non-governmental actors might have an impact on the 
local level, namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of 
livelihood.   
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Chapter 3. Background  
!
In order to get a better understanding of what the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is all about 
and what role cocoa historically has played in the country I want to briefly account for 
some background information.  
3.1 Côte d’Ivoire – diversity, cocoa wars and land  
!
The war in Côte d’Ivoire is often portrayed as a typical West-African conflict with 
ethnic vengeances, rooted in greed over resources and nested in patrimonial networks. 
But in contrast to neighbouring Liberia or Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire is very different 
from the so-called “failed states” of the region,37 although it has been branded as such 
(see Global Witness 2007, p.14; O'Bannon 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). 
Indeed the unravelling of the “economic powerhouse of the African continent” in the 
nineties came somewhat unexpectedly (O'Bannon 2012, p.5): “There was a deep sense 
of shock in Abidjan. This was the first time this had happened in nearly forty years of 
independent rule” (Ryan 2011, p.33). Côte d’Ivoire is somewhat special when it comes 
to post-colonial development, as Chirot (2006) explains. He argues that the close ties 
to France and Boigny’s choice to enter market capitalism, created a national welfare 
system and economy that was quite special. He outlines that of the 4,5 million citizens 
in the early 1970s, “about 50,000 were metropolitan Frenchmen and another 100,000 
were French-passport holders—including a substantial ethnic Lebanese business class” 
(ibid., p.65).The country simply was one of the most progressive and prosperous in the 
region.   
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37 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) are amongst those quick to declare the Côte d’Ivoire as a failed 
state at the same level as Somalia: “Extractive institutions that expropriate and impoverish the people 
and block economic development are quite common in Africa, Asia, and South America. (…) The 
pattern of extractive institutions collapsing into civil war and state failure has happened elsewhere in 
Africa” (2012, p.376). The ICG report from the 2004 does for example remark: “At first sight Côte 
d’Ivoire does not appear to fall info the same category as Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is clearly not a 
‚failed state’ they became: the roads are still in good condition, the country is still shipping more 
cocoa than any other, and Abidjan’s Plateau neighbourhood is home to many skyscrapers” (ICG 2004, 
p.4). Others also note the sophisticated style of wealth-extraction in comparison to Liberia or Sierra 
Leone (Skogseth 2006, p.23; McGovern 2011, p.165). 
!34 
3.1.1 Ethnicity and economics  
!
So how did the country end up in a decade of conflict? Looking into the country’s 
ethnic and economic background may provide some answers. Côte d’Ivoire counts 
about 60 ethnic groups. However none of them dominate or represent an “ethno-
linguistic centre of gravity” (Groves 2006, p.1), which means that no ethnicity has an 
“automatic” right to rule due its majority. The OECD and others divide the Ivorian 
ethnicities according to the four main ethno-linguistic groups: Mandé, Voltaïque, Krou 
and Kwa (see Figure 4).  
!
Figure 4 Ethno-linguistic map of Côte d'Ivoire from OECD 
In the south the Kwa, consist of the Baoulé and Ebriy Lagoon groups, while the Kru 
are mostly Bété people. Further North the Mandé contain Malinké, Bambara, Dioula, 
while Voltaïque people are Senoufou, Djimini and Tagouana.38 Both the absence of an 
ethno-linguistic “centre of gravity” and the strong division into major groupings are 
seen as impediments for national unity (Groves 2006, p.1 f). 
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38 The bolded groups are those that are most important for the historical overview as well as the micro-
level analysis.  
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Regardless of the tricky ethnic composition in Côte d’Ivoire, the country did not 
disintegrate after independence. Some say it is because Boigny, a Baoulé himself, was 
able to include different ethnicities in his government. Although others (see Langer 
2004) rightly argue that only Baoulés entered the main power circle, non-Bauolés were 
still represented at high levels in politics. They were for example integrated in the 
PDCI-structure and had full political rights (see Skogseth 2006). Others claim that 
Boigny bought Northern elites off in order to keep the country calm (Chirot 2006, 
p.68; Ayangafac 2009, p.35). However, he was the one who encouraged migration 
towards the South, installing liberal rules for landownership. 
Divisions between the North and South existed already under Boigny and were 
due to geographies, ethnicity and religion. The country is further divided by 
inequalities between the people and elites (Langer 2004). This might be especially 
important for the internal divisions in the cocoa-producing Western part of the country 
where a number of ethnic groups lived and worked together (Owusu-Sekyere 2009). It 
can be argued that Boigny’s liberal land and migration policies were designed “to 
ameliorate the profound economic inequalities between the north and the south by 
allowing migrants from the north to settle quickly“ (Meehan 2011, p.1).39 This 
however created three distinct groups in the south: the autochthones, Bété, Dan and 
Guére, who are considered as the “first settlers”, then the allochthones of Baoulé, 
Senoufou and Dioula who migrated inside the Côte d’Ivoire. There are also the 
“foreigners”, the so-called allogenes, who are from Burkina Faso and Mali (O'Bannon 
2012, p.8).  
After four decades of ethnically-balanced politics, did the country’s economic 
downturn result in an politicisation of identity (see Meehan 2011). While parties were 
already religiously and regionally defined, the invention of “Ivorité” enabled political 
parties to present themselves also according to ethnicity. Bédié excluded other 
ethnicities rather strictly, which led to the so-called “Baoulisation” of politics (Langer 
2004, p.26). After the military coup of General Guéï, a “de-Baoulisation” and “de-
Akanisation” occurred, which meant that these ethnic groups were discriminated 
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39 Other factors also argue in that direction with increased public investment in the 1970s (Langer 
2004, p.12 f). 
!36 
against. Gbagbo in turn tried to promote his Bété/Kru followers into powerful 
positions. 
My main point is that governments after Boigny increasingly politicised ethnic 
identity. Boigny kept the country together by including and balancing different 
ethnicities. McGovern (2011) even attributes the entire Ivorian identity to him.40 He 
argues that the Ivorians still have so much trust in Boigny that discrediting his politics 
would eventually mean denouncing the nation’s identity as a whole (ibid., p.155).  
!
Picture 1 Boigny as a preacher for peace in Abidjan-Cocody 
The impact of the economic crisis is a second important aspect. Many argue that the 
start of the economic recession coincides with the considerable decline in prices for 
cocoa and coffee (Skogseth 2006). Others are arguing that the rise in oil price, the 
rising dollar and large interests rates contributed to the economic downturn (Akindès 
2004, p.17). Being largely built on revenues from agricultural crops, the government 
was unable to provide essential services without heavily indebting the country. A 
decline in jobs in the government and less investment in health and education caused 
unemployment and the deterioration in living conditions (Akindès 2004). Especially 
critical here was large-scale youth unemployment, which formed the recruitment base 
for Gbagbo’s and other militia groups such as the traditional dozo-hunters (Skogseth 
2006, p.20; Hellweg 2011; Banégas 2012).  
The World Bank and IMF insisted on structural adjustment reforms and 
liberalisation first and foremost in the cocoa sector. But one of the important 
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40 “Ivorians have an acute sense of the ways in which Houphouet-Boigny, for better or worse, held the 
country together through sheer force of will and personal political skill” (McGovern 2011, p.154). 
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consequences of the economic downturn were the “exacerbated tensions between 
indigenous and immigrants on the one hand and between migrants from the North and 
locals in the affluent South.” (Langer 2004, p.13). This was one of the main reasons 
why ethnicity was utilised in the political game and why the ethnic card has been 
increasingly been played in order to win votes and re-shape identity.41 
3.1.2 Land ownership, greed and scarcity 
!
Theories explaining the conflict rely heavily on features of ethnicity and the economy.   
The autochthony argument (see Bøås & Dunn 2013; Lund 2011; Chauveau & 
Richards 2008) focuses on the importance of belonging to a certain area or land. This 
kind of belonging reasons the access to long-term revenues of that land.42 As outlined 
above, Boigny promoted the migration of allochthones and allogenes to the booming 
south to meet the demand for workforce in cocoa. The land rights system of the tutorat 
encouraged this migration. Chauveau (2006) outlines the tutorat as a system common 
in rural societies and as an tool to regulate the relationship between the first-comers, 
the autochthones, and the “new-comers”. Being based on the moral code that everyone 
should be able to provide means of subsistence to his family, the tutorat grants access 
to “free” land and hence incorporates foreigners into the community. Especially for 
cocoa and coffee, the use of the tutorat meant the long-term transfer of land rights. It 
should however not be mistaken for “renting, sharecropping and other short or middle- 
term transfers of land use rights” (Chauveau & Colin 2010, p.87).43 The system was 
further supported by a decree by Boigny from 1967 “which stated that ‘the land 
belongs to he who cultivates it’”(Global Witness 2007, p.13) as he wanted to push 
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41 Chirot (2006). argues along the lines of Horowitz on outlining the consequences for election: 
“Under such circumstances, as Donald Horowitz points out, elections in ethnically divided societies 
become substitute censuses, giving those in power every incentive to distort results lest they risk 
falling into the minority as a result of demographic changes. Rather than creating harmony and 
stability, elections then become an invitation to fraud and open conflict“ (Chirot 2006, p.69). 
42 “Autochthony implies that one is entitled to belong because of ancestral rights to land. Simply put, 
the claim is ‚this is ours because we were here first’“ (Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.102). 
43 “The autochthone-migrant relationships that were established were similar to the ‘stranger-father’- 
relationships in Liberia and the forest region of Guinea (...). In Côte d’Ivoire this structure is known as 
the tutorat institution. This institution establishes a bond of patronage between the autochthon and the 
migrant, to whom land rights are extended on the basis of the principles of a moral economy: any 
individual has a right to the amount of land necessary to ensure his and his family’s subsistence“ 
(Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.114). 
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agriculture as a main economic force. Disputes over land rights and properties 
eventually arose in the wake of the economic crisis of the ‘80s/ ‘90s and the increasing 
scarcity of land (see McGovern 2011; Bøås & Huser 2006). 
A political solution to these problems was offered in the concept of “Ivoirité” 
and the land reform of 1998, which supports the property rights of  “the first settlers”, 
the so-called “sons of the soil” (Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.102). Suddenly, these 
autochthones had a stronger legal claim over land than the allogenes and allochthones. 
A further decrease in civil and social rights for northern migrants ignited conflict. 
Deep-felt grievances on both sides started to emerge and to be politicised as Bax 
(2003) depicts. Due to the close connection of political programme, migration and 
land rights issues is often said that the autochthony question is “the heart of the Ivorian 
crisis” (McGovern 2011, p.7), granting civil and social rights to one group but not the 
other. Some (Chauveau & Richards 2008; Richards 2011) claim however that the 
autochthony argument is just an epiphenomenon; that ethnicity and belonging are used 
to mask the struggle over scarce land.   
Another main explanation of the conflict is the argument of greed for 
agricultural resources. Some claim that resources, mainly cocoa, are most important 
and that the Ivorian conflict boils down to a dispute between patrimonial networks 
trying to gain control over revenues (see Ryan 2011; Woods 2003; Alongi 2011; 
Global Witness 2007). Proponents of this explanation argue that the cocoa exports 
played a similar role in financing the war as “conflict timber” did in Liberia or 
“conflict diamonds” in Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2007). By uncovering the 
revenue system of the cocoa trade and its political importance for Boigny, Gbagbo and 
Ouattara, authors like Woods (2003; 1999) analyse the cocoa rent-seeking strategies of 
political elites. An important aspect of the rent-seeking argument is the relative 
scarcity and competition for land for cocoa. This touches upon the Neo-Malthusian 
argument, claiming that conflict is more likely when people compete over scarce 
resources (see Hendrix & Glaser 2007; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012; Trombetta 2012; 
Furlong et al. 2006; Le Billion 2001).   
 I believe that both the autochthony and rent-seeking argument can explain some 
aspects of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Knowing possible causes further helps in 
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understanding the post-conflict challenges that this thesis deals with. I find it useful to 
refer to a multi-level and multi-causal explanation for the Ivorian case (see McGovern 
2011; Bellier 2011; Bøås & Dunn 2013; O'Bannon 2012). McGovern (2011) for 
example argues that the conflict rhetoric of xenophobia has long-term and short-term 
purposes. Immediately, hatred against foreigners can cover the looting of economic 
gains. In the longer term, xenophobia helps to disqualify political opponents and gain 
economic power (ibid., p.165). O’Bannon (2012) argues similarly that the conflict 
deals with three separate yet connected levels. On the local level, the conflict is rooted 
in land disputes that existed earlier, but have intensified and escalated over the course 
of the 1990s. Nationally a number of factors, like the death of Boigny and the 
economic downturn, exaggerated the struggle over the neo-patrimonial state. 
Regionally, the conflict is connected to political and ethnic relationships with Burkina 
Faso, Liberia, Mali and Ghana.44 The complexity of the case and the interaction 
between those levels and time-perspectives create difficulties for post-conflict 
management. 
3.2 How to make chocolate – the Cocoa-Value Chain 
!
The cocoa value chain includes a number of actors. The analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 
will refer to some of these and some other technicalities of the cocoa value chain, 
which I will therefore briefly present here.  
The chocolate production is essentially dependent on the tricky theobroma tree, 
with origins in Central America. The tree counts around 15 different sub-species and 
has very specific needs for optimal growth; it needs a humid, hot climate and thrives in 
15-20 degrees latitude from the equator. The theobroma grows in tropical and lush 
vegetation with shade and annual average temperatures of 25 degrees, in an altitude 
below 500 meters above sea level (Bøås & Huser 2006; World Cocoa Foundation 
2014). The plant is very vulnerable to changes in these optimal conditions and prone to 
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44 “Local violence between indigenous and ‘foreigners’ erupts over land tenure disputes, which fuels 
the flames of the national-level discourse of autochthony and xenophobia. For their part, national-level 
politicians seem keen to instrumentalise local disputes to help wage their own battles and in doing so 
help create a hostile climate in which more local conflict is likely. As a result, local violence, even that 
driven by local concerns, often reflects the national cleavage, or the master conflict narrative” 
(O'Bannon 2012, p.4).   
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diseases and insects. It measures five to eight meters when fully developed and 
produces pods containing the cocoa seeds only for a limited time during its 25 to 30 
years-long life span. After planting the seedlings, farmers have to wait seven years 
before the crop reaches its potential, thereafter the tree’s production increases for 13 
years before rapidly declining (see Bøås & Huser 2006).  
Investment and innovation in fertilizers, new hybrids and improved techniques 
can have a large impact in the productivity of the plant. Ruf (2007) looks for example 
at three possible options for improved productivity: the expansion of production area, 
a “green revolution” with hybrid adoption and heavy use of fertilizer, and a “double 
green revolution” including seed technologies, mixed-crop planting and organic 
fertilizers. He finds that both expansion and hybrid adoption/ fertilizers have negative 
consequences. Instead he argues that a yield increase is most likely with the “double 
green revolution” option including diversification. This might be important also in 
regards to effects and challenges by climate change (Ruf et al. 2015). 
 68% of worldwide cocoa supply is produced in Africa, mainly in the West 
(Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire) and the Centre (DRC). Asia produces 17% 
and the Americas 15%. Côte d’Ivoire is and has long been the largest producer of 
cocoa, generating about 33% of the world’s supply. During the last couple of years 
there has been an increase both in quality as well as demand for cocoa.  
Cocoa is a cash crop largely produced on family-farms and by smallholders. 
They are called “plantations” even though they are considerably smaller than tea or 
coffee plantations. Farmers have to care for the tree the whole year round due to its 
sensitivity to pests and changes in its environment. It needs to be underlined that cocoa 
farming demands not only a lot of hard labour but also a lot of knowledge. This 
mixture of labour and skill is one of the special aspects and represents some of the 
difficulties in recruiting new farmers. From five years onwards the tree can be 
harvested twice a year (World Cocoa Foundation 2014),45 though some areas and sorts 
can produce all year around. The ripe yellow pods are pulled from the trees, collected 
and cracked open to remove the cocoa beans that are covered with a white and bitter 
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45 The main harvest season in Côte d’Ivoire is from September to December and then a smaller one 
from April to June (Bøås & Huser 2006, p.16). Fluctuations in weather patterns can affect these 
harvesting times (World Cocoa Foundation 2014, p.4). 
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pulp. Depending on the plant and quality, a pod contains 20-50 single 
cocoa beans. Thereafter the beans are collected in one place and 
covered with mats or banana leaves. This starts the fermentation 
process of the white pulp, which takes three to seven days; here the 
cocoa develops its aromatic taste. The fermentation is therefore a 
critical step in order to produce good quality cocoa. After fermenting, 
the beans are laid out in the sun to dry. After they pack the beans in 
plastic or jute bags, farmers deliver their cocoa to local buying agents 
(known as “pisteurs” in Côte d’Ivoire) or co-operatives.46 From there 
the local buyer sells the beans to an exporting company for further 
marketing. After quality controls, the cocoa might be dried some more 
before being exported to the processing location, which includes 
grinding the cocoa, pressing of the cocoa mass and chocolate making. 
These last stages of processing, outside the production country add a 
considerable economic value to the product. About 40% of the 
processing sites are located in Europe, especially the Netherlands 
(World Cocoa Foundation 2014). This marks a division of labour and 
value, with the most labour-intensive part (planting, harvesting, 
fermenting and drying) being executed in the producing countries, 
while the exporting and processing that adds most value is completed 
in more developed countries.  
3.3 Côte de Cocoa   
!
Côte d’Ivoire is the largest supplier of cocoa worldwide, exporting 
between 30-40% of the global cocoa (Hatløy et al. 2012; VOICE 
Network 2015; World Cocoa Foundation 2014). Produced on over 
600,000 farms, cocoa employs “more than four million of the country’s 
22 million inhabitants” (Hatløy et al. 2012, p.8). The average farm counts 3 hectares 
and produces 450 kg of cocoa per hectare. Only 17% of the cocoa produced is also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 The “farmgate”/ producer price established by the PDCI and CAISTAB was a major planning 
instrument for farmers and secured that each cocoa planter knew how much he could get for his cocoa 
(McGovern 2011, p.159). 
Figure 5 The 
cocoa value 
chain 
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processed in Côte d’Ivoire (Global Witness 2007, p.17). The rest of it is directly 
exported via San Pedro and Abidjan ports.47 The numbers on the share of cocoa for the 
GDP vary, but are estimated to be 6.99% for 2009 (Abbott 2013, p.256) and about 
1.35 million tonnes per year.  
As mentioned previously, cocoa is a major political and economic factor for the 
country (Global Witness 2007; Woods 2003; Jadot 2013). But in order to understand 
the circumstances of cocoa investment and the role the crop has played, I want to 
briefly review some parts of the cocoa history. Already the French colonialists had 
thought about planting theobroma, but cocoa farming only took off after 
independence. Ryan (2011) argues that Boigny was not interested in industrialisation 
but prioritized agricultural growth instead: “If Côte d'Ivoire is to prosper, the Ivorian 
president said, farmers should grow coffee and cocoa” (ibid., p.26). The export of 
cocoa beans became the motor of Ivorian economic development from the 1960s to the 
late 1980s. Produced in small plantations, farmers were organised in cooperatives and 
farmers’ organisations, and the state-owned Caisse de Stabilisation (CAISTAB) was a 
stabilisation fund for cocoa-planters setting the cocoa price.48 There are debates over 
the form of this first cocoa revenue system. Some argue that it symbolised the interests 
of a so-called “planter bourgeoisie”, a Baoulé-dominated, ethnically-determined elite 
that gathered most revenues from cocoa. Others claim that it was a smallholder-
friendly system; while again others debate that so-called “gros planteurs”, the large-
scale producers of 20 tonnes or more, were the biggest winners (McGovern 2011, 
p.143). McGovern concludes that urban political elites were those most profiting from 
Boigny’s system by using CAISTAB as a “financial black box”. These semi-illicit and 
neo-patrimonial revenue networks were so non-transparent that both the IMF and 
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47 “53 Four large multinational companies – the American companies ADM and Cargill, the French 
company CEMOI and the Swiss company Barry Callebaut – as well as the Ivorian company Pronibex 
have invested in cocoa-processing capacity in Côte d’Ivoire, as a result of government policies to 
encourage exports of semi-finished products” (Global Witness 2007, p.17).  
48 “Since 1964, government officials simply skimmed a certain amount off the top of all cocoa sales, 
placing money into the cocoa-coffee stabilisation fund set up as part of the marketing system or 
‘filière’, in order to ensure stable prices for producers even in years when the international price 
dipped” (McGovern 2011, p.138). 
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World Bank argued for liberalising cocoa in the 1990s.49 With the economic crisis and 
the decrease of cocoa prices, the government declared the “cocoa war” in 1987. 
Counting on their power as largest supplier, Boigny held back cocoa to artificially 
increase the price. After two years of self-declared export stop, without the desired 
effect, the ban was lifted and left the sector weakened (McGovern 2011, p.145). The 
continued decline in cocoa prices further worsened the situation further. In an 
economy which rested heavily on the shoulders of the cocoa planters, this had 
devastating results.  
It was not only farmers and those directly involved in the cocoa sector that 
faced serious difficulties. In the booming days of cocoa, the secondary and tertiary 
sectors in the cities grew and attracted work migrants (Chirot 2006). With the decline 
in the economic motor, these sectors also had to lay off workers, and particularly 
young men had to return to their home towns. Especially for the younger work 
migrants the crisis created deep frustrations and “(...) the feeling that their future had 
been sold out from under them” (McGovern 2011, p.141). These young men returned 
to the plantations of their families in the West and found their claims contested by 
migrants who had worked their way up, adding more frustrations. 
The liberalization-reform of the cocoa system was finalised in 1999 with the 
dismantling of CAISTAB, which in essence led to “leaving the private sector to handle 
marketing and producer prices” (Agritrade 2012, p.2). Many argue that the reform was 
unsuccessful in increasing sector transparency, but instead intensified illicit activities 
to be “more elaborate, better hidden, yet sometimes even greater in scale and scope” 
(McGovern 2011, p.158).  
Gbagbo, an outsider of the cocoa system and his Bété followers, tried to access 
the cocoa revenues as well (see Ryan 2011, p.69). But instead of one organisation 
remaining responsible, Gbagbo dispersed responsibilities into four new 
organisations.50 These new agencies demanded a nine-fold of fees and taxes from 
farmers without adding any benefits (McGovern 2011, p.161). This leads researchers 
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49 However one can also find that the illicit cocoa network had a certain ‘trickle-down’ effect, 
increasing health care, school system and other social measures (McGovern 2011, p.140). 
50 The Autorité de Régulation du Café et du Cacao (ARCC), the Bourse du Café et Cacao (BCC), the 
Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle du Café et Cacao (FRC) and the Fonds de Développement et de 
Promotion des Activités des Producteurs de Café et de Cacao (FGCCC). 
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to claim that the reform had a devastating effect on cocoa farmers’ livelihoods. 
Gbagbo’s government took “away from the cocoa farmers in order to enrich 
individuals close to the [him] and the FPI" (ibid., p.163). In other words, the relatively 
stabilising neo-patrimonial system of Boigny was over time replaced by the complex 
illicit network of Gbagbo. 
Cocoa production declined somewhat in the years of instability, but exports 
were still going out. Cocoa was looted and exported because “everybody can make 
their margin, the government can get its revenue (…) It was in no one's interest for the 
beans to stay on the farm" (Ryan 2011, pp.36/37). A report by Global Witness 
suggests that cocoa financed both sides of the conflict with a minimum of US$20.3 
million (Global Witness 2007, p.5). Others argue that it was about US$118 million 
(Boka-Mene & Whyche-Shaw 2009). After the crisis of 2010-11, Ouattara reformed 
the cocoa system almost immediately. His government removed all former structures 
and integrated all organisations into the Conseil du Café Cacao (CCC), which serves 
as one of the points of departure in Chapter 4 and 5. 
Ruf compares large-scale cocoa producers and points towards the peak in Côte 
d’Ivoire’s production in the 1970s, which has been gradually declining thereafter (Ruf 
2007, p.2).51 The decline in cocoa productivity is not a sole Ivorian issue, but some 
argue that Ghana’s production organisation has saved farmers from some of the more 
negative influences (Bøås & Huser 2006). Privatisation and taxation burdens 
especially had an impact on the decline in cocoa quality in Côte d’Ivoire (FSG 2009). 
Additionally cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire is more of a mono-crop and demands higher input 
costs in comparison to Ghana (VOICE Network 2015).52  
The cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire is therefore is without a doubt the heart and the 
blood of the Ivorian economy (Bøås & Huser 2006, p.21). It is a crop that guaranteed 
enormous growth, as well as being used in financing the country’s violent conflict. It 
is a sector that has been subject to a number of reforms, but the results of these are 
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51 “Unfortunately, since 2003/04, a dramatic taxation on cocoa has reversed the trend, discouraging 
farmers. Average yields are stagnating or even declining again in many regions of Côte d’Ivoire” (Ruf 
2007, p.2). 
52 The Cocoa Barometer argues that 90% of the cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire only crop cocoa, 
compared to 78% in Ghana. Input costs per ha are calculated at US$ 513 (Côte d’Ivoire) against US$ 
360 (Ghana) (VOICE Network 2015, p.26).  
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somewhat lagging behind. Ruf (2007) argues that that is related to the life-cycle of the 
plant (ibid., p.3). A lot of observers claim that the system in itself is deeply corrupt and 
opaque (Global Witness 2007). Hatløy et al (2012) argue further that the sector is 
facing a large number of problems in the future. Main social constraints are: child 
labour, lack of access to infrastructure, ageing of famers and cocoa trees. The sector 
also faces a number of economic constraints, for example the lack of access to finance 
and agricultural inputs and problems in cooperative organisation. Environmental 
problems, like land degradation and pests, as well as political problems add to these 
issues.  
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Chapter 4. National-scale analysis 
!
Starting my analysis on the national level, I will first evaluate the capitalist peace 
theory (see Schneider & Gleditsch 2013; De Soysa & Fjelde 2010). I will do so by 
looking more closely into the country’s investment activity after 2011. Thereafter, I 
will review some general trends of the reconciliation process before discussing 
investment-activities according to capitalist peace assumptions. 
4.1 Cocoa investment in Côte d’Ivoire   
!
In order to assess the investment activities, it is essential to have an overview of main 
investors, types of investment and project objectives. By looking at statistics and 
reports, I can argue that general and cocoa investment increased after the 2011-crisis 
before I introduce the mapping of main investment data.  
4.1.1 What does investment look like? 
!
To start with, it is worth noticing that financing in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire 
differs greatly from investing in other agricultural commodities like rubber or palm 
Figure 6 Most important actors in the cocoa sector 
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oil.53 Cocoa is, as mentioned in the background chapter, a crop that is farmed by 
families on a small-scale which effects the scale of private and governmental 
investment. The number of actors involved in cocoa investment, however, is vast (see 
Global Witness 2007; Hatløy et al. 2012). I depicted the most important entities for 
this thesis in Figure 6. The figure includes main cocoa exporters, like Barry Callebaut 
or Cemoi in red,54 most of whom have their own cocoa sustainability programmes. In 
orange are the programme owners, like the German Development Agency (GIZ). The 
sub-governmental bodies, like the Conseil Café Cacao (CCC) are in green and other 
important players in yellow. All these actors cooperate in programmes as part of 
business-NGO networks (see Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015) investing 
together. Take the World Cocoa Foundation’s (WCF) ‘Cocoa Livelihood programme’ 
for example. It is financially supported by: four cocoa processors (ADM, Blommer 
etc.), three manufacturers (Mars, Hershey etc.), ten supply chain managers (Olam, 
Petra etc.), the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, the German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative 
(IDH). The implementation is managed by the WCF but executed by five agencies 
(GIZ, TechnoServe etc.). This complicates things not only in terms of data collection 
but these complex investor-networks cause difficulties when trying to aggregate the 
impact from single actors.55  
Investment activities can be described as three types. Firstly, projects trying to 
increase the amount and quality of cocoa, which try to counter the decreased cocoa 
productivity that started in the 1980s (see Chapter 3) and consist of teaching 
agricultural practices or the distribution of fertilizers. This may impact farmers’ 
livelihoods, but aims mainly at increased export yields. A second investment type aims 
at improving farmers’ livelihoods by teaching planters good business practices or 
educating co-operatives in management skills. Third and last are investments with a 
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53 These crops are more often connected with larger scale and industrial plantations, although they are 
sometimes and in countries such as Liberia planted on family farms as well. 
54 This overview gives an estimation of their market share (George 2014).  
55 Since the cocoa sector is a rather sensitive sector and due to the request of some interviewed experts, 
I make the data as anonymous as possible. However there is a list of actors I talked to attached in 
Annex 1.  
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corporate responsibility approach,56 which usually contain social infrastructure 
projects such as school buildings, health centres and water points.57 The data I 
gathered consists of all types of investments. For the selection of the focus groups in 
Chapter 5 I picked one of the programmes from the second category of farmer 
business schooling. 
When reviewing these sorts of projects, it is worth noticing that most of them 
do not have a specific conflict-reducing objective. Initiatives like farmer business 
schooling try to include younger farmers (at least 50 per cent of the participants should 
be under 30 years) and female planters. However they are not selecting recruits that 
are ex-combatants or targeting more conflict-affected communities. One of the 
projects that does have a conflict-sensitive approach is the newly established CCC-
programme ‘Jeunes agriculteurs’, the young farmers’ initiative (see Akinocho 2014). It 
combines cocoa investment and increased farmer livelihood with specific focus to 
youth “strongly impacted by the war”. According to the official objectives, the project 
intends to promote youth employment, diversify revenue sources and increase yields.58 
My interview partner at the CCC was more specific on the target group for the 
initiative and added that they want to aid in the reconciliation process and make ex-
combatants “forget all kinds of ideas of war”.59 One newspaper article on the 
campaign kick-off in Bougouanou further mentions that parts of the recruits have been 
recommended from the national agency for DDR, the Autorité pour le Désarmement, 
la Démobilisation et la Réintégration (ADDR) (Yéboué 2015). Another more specific 
reconciliation project is the World Bank’s Project for Post-Conflict Assistance (PAPC) 
programme, which supports, amongst others, youth at risk re-integrating into civil life. 
The project tries to initiate income-generating activities both for individuals and 
communities some located in agriculture and cocoa (Gov CDI 2013a). While one 
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56 Many of the firms discuss the so-called “three Ps”: People, Planet and Profit/ Productivity, which 
combines a CSR approach on farmer livelihood, ecological sustainability and increased economic 
return. 
57 Often these programmes are partially financed through surpluses of certified cocoa sold.  
58 “The Director General of the Conseil Café-Cacao Massandjé Touré, revealed that the project was 
initiated in 2014 and is part of the vision of President Ouattara and his government to solve the 
problem of youth employment. She said that this project aims at the promotion and integration of 
youth, diversification of sources of income across different cultures, improving the processing of 
products locally” (Yéboué 2015). 
59 “Its important to stop the young from coming up with any kind of ideas about war”. 
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implementing expert argued that the conflict represents an important cross-cutting 
issue in designing projects, there seems to be no overarching reconciliation approach 
for cocoa investment. The main objective is the increase of productivity.60  
The capitalist peace assumptions however do not outline that the intentions of an 
investment project plays any major role for the theory to be valid. Hence I gather that 
even if most investment programmes do not aim at improving reconciliation, any 
investment as part of the (re-) integration into the capitalist system should, by default 
have a pacifying effect.   
4.1.2 Investment increase after Gbagbo left the stage  
!
As previously indicated, Côte d’Ivoire was one of Africa’s great economic miracles 
and suffered immensely under the economic downturn, the corrupt practices of the 
Gbagbo government (ICG 2011a, p.3) and the electoral crisis. This economic decline 
pre-2011 is apparent both in reports and statistics of the country, as the six months of 
unrest in 2010-11 alone led to a decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 6.3% 
(ICG 2011a, p.13). Most international companies and personnel, especially from the 
biggest business ally, France, left the country in fear of violence (BBC 2010b; BBC 
2010c). This sharp decline in investment is also noticeable in the long-term inflow of 
investment, remittances and aid (see Figure 7). Aid Data (Aid Data 2014) reveals here 
that the civil war period from 2001-2 is marked by shifting money inflow. Especially 
after the peak in 2009 and around the crisis 2010/11, there is a drop in investment. 
!
Figure 7 Inflow of aid, remittances and investment in Côte d'Ivoire (Aid Data) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 “Everyone is talking about doubling yields, but for that to happen labour is needed, then we need to 
make sure that schools are in place to avoid child labour.”/ “Everyone wants to increase yields to 
increase livelihood”.  
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Regarding cocoa, experts argue that the “tensions starved Ivory Coast of investment 
and sapped the confidence of cocoa growers” (BBC 2010a). Farmers were less likely 
to re-invest in cocoa and did not plant new seedlings. Regarding the lifecycle of the 
tree such lack in re-investment has negative long-term consequences. Until the EU and 
the US imposed sanctions on cocoa (BBC 2011b; BBC 2011e; BBC 2011f; BBC 
2010b), exports proceeded normal (BBC 2011d). After the sanctions were in place, 
most cocoa was either stored at the harbours or smuggled to Ghana or Burkina Faso, 
where it was re-packed, re-labelled and sold off. One BBC report argues that about 
500,000 tones of cocoa were temporarily held back due to the crisis (BBC 2011f).61 
Estimations of the amount of smuggled cocoa are less certain but should be 
considerable (see Mark 2011). All in all one can notice an “absence of investment and 
policy incentives and the deterioration of infrastructure” (Agritrade 2012, p.2) and the 
temporary cut-off from the global cocoa market.62  
 Ouattara’s government did start to prioritise economic recovery early (BBC 
2011j). Increased GDP, better infrastructure, economic reforms and raised investments 
were main objectives right from May 2011 onwards (see BBC 2011o; Boisvert 2014; 
Kobo 2014; Maritz 2014). This National Development Plan highlights the importance 
of attracting private investment (Gov CDI 2012b, p.8), especially in the renewal of 
cocoa farms and support of intensive plantations (Gov CDI 2012b, p.31). The National 
Investment Plan in Agriculture (Gov CDI 2012a) bears the same logic and outlines 
three main areas for intervention, in which the state should cooperate with research 
institutions and chocolate exporters to establish private-public partnerships.  
Macro-economic reviews show an overall GDP-growth of 8.6% in 2012, 
including cocoa exports that increased by 1.1% (Yembiline et al. 2014). This 
considerable increase in GDP re-installs Côte d’Ivoire as one of the top-growing 
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61 As early as January 2011, reports mention the difficulty of cocoa exporters in dealing with 
Gbagbo’s government as problematic: “They [the major cocoa exporters] will be worried about losing 
their licences if Mr Ouattara does ever come to power, he [director of export firm] says. And global 
companies could be concerned about their international reputations if they are seen to be dealing with 
an administration seen as illegitimate by the world community, he says” (BBC 2011d). “While most 
big cocoa traders, including US food giant Cargill, have actively said they will respect the ban, others, 
such as Nestle, have not, says Ms Tasfay. ‚Tariffs and port taxes will likely be increased [...] raising 
operating costs for companies that are still trading in Côte d’Ivoire” (Anderson 2011). 
62Sanctions in themselves mark the end of free trade as Mousseau and others argue (Mousseau 2010; 
Hegre 2005; Polachek et al. 1999).  
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economies on the continent (Hedley et al. 2014).63 But more important for this thesis is 
the increase in investment. According to Yembiline et al, the country could refer to a 
39.9% growth in investment (Yembiline et al. 2014, p.52). Alby (2014) and others 
voice expectations of massive inflow of private and public investment in Côte 
d’Ivoire. It is somewhat tricky to only rely on such statistics, since they are very 
difficult to access for the cocoa sector and because they might exclude so-called 
“shadow economies”, namely the informal sector and agriculture. This might bias the 
results (see Jerven 2011). However most investment reviews further confirm the 
country’s attractiveness to investors; the US Department of State (Grauer 2015) deems 
Côte d’Ivoire as “fertile soil for US investments” as well as “one of the best bets in 
Africa for business growth and opportunities” (ibid. 2015, p.1 f). Reforms and the 
adoption of a new investment 
code in 2012 might have 
further attracted foreign direct 
investment, as Monnier (2014) 
points out. Some smaller signs 
further signal that Côte 
d’Ivoire is “back in business”: 
for example the first African 
visit of the French president 
was to Côte d’Ivoire (BBC 
2014b), large investors 
conferences (Gov CDI 2013b) 
and media reports about the rise 
in international investors (BBC 2014c).  
It is especially cocoa that seems to attract investors again. Being one of the 
main targets for Ouattara’s FN troops San Pedro was captured early on (BBC 2011n; 
BBC 2011l; BBC 2011d) in order to gain control over the cocoa revenues (BBC 
2011c). The renewed investor interest is also noticeable in increased exporters’ 
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63 Regional GDP comparisons are somewhat unreliable as Jerven (2011) underlines due to the 
differing methods of calculating the national figures. The quoted numbers here come from IMF and 
AfDB estimates as well as national authorities.  
Figure 8 Investment ratio (Yembiline et al 2014) 
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activities as my interview partners argue.64 One of the first larger investment projects 
was revealed in November 2011, when Cargill announced investment of US$3 million 
in improving and renewing cocoa plantations (ICG 2011b, p.7). Nestlé invested CFA 
10 billion, in 2012 and 2013 (Monnier 2014). CEMOI announced plans to build a 
factory for chocolate production (Africa Report 2015). Many others followed, also 
because the CCC installed a platform for private-public partnerships in cocoa. 
4.2 Mapping investment and conflict in the Côte d’Ivoire   
!
Aside from the national investment outlook, I wanted to locate the investment in cocoa 
value chains in order to cross-check the relation to investment patterns and conflict 
hotspots. As 
outlined in the 
background 
chapters, cocoa only 
grows under very 
specific conditions. 
These are limited to 
the southern regions 
in Côte d’Ivoire, 
namely: (Dix-Huit) 
Montagnes, Moyen 
Cavally, Haut-Sassandra, Bas-Sassandra, Sud Bandama, Fromager, Marahoue, Lacs, 
N’zi Comoe, Moyen Comoe, Agneby, Sud Comoe (see Figure 9). It was, as previously 
mentioned, very difficult to get access to data on the locations of the investments. One 
of the few overviews on project sites I received from an informant depicted project 
sites of the CCC, but was too broad to be informative. Due to the lack of a proper 
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64 “There have been substantial investments in agro-industry and the extractive and food industries. 
The principal countries of origin of investment were Singapore, France, Lebanon and the UK. […] 
Agriculture, mining, and hydrocarbons sectors represent important investment opportunities” (Gov 
UK 2014). Other signs of increased investment lie in the return of the African Development Bank to 
Abidjan in 2014 and the 22 of 75 agricultural projects started during the International Forum of 
Investment in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Figure 9 Map of cocoa-producing regions in Côte d'Ivoire 
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cocoa-investment map, I gathered as much data myself and geo-referenced the 
locations as described in chapter 1 (see Figure 10).  
This overview 
indicates the 
locations of 
140 project 
sites, which 
have been 
installed after 
2011, and 
includes 
private, 
governmental 
and donor 
agencies (see 
Annex 3). 
The colour code signals the main focus of the investment project: green stands for 
projects to increase cocoa quality/ quantity, blue describes projects focusing on 
education (building of schools and education programmes), black points to 
infrastructure (building of health stations, water points etc.) and yellow marks youth 
projects. Overall is seems as if investments are largely focused on building schools as 
well as increasing cocoa yields through quality insurance programmes. Infrastructure 
project are less apparent and restricted to the Daloa-San Pedro route. This is not 
surprising since this route is the main access way to the harbour. Youth projects are 
also less apparent. From the information that is accessible it seems as if investment 
projects have a strong focus on building schools and infrastructure. From informants I 
heard however that there are a lot more projects that deal with the increase of cocoa 
quality and quantity, but these project sites are much harder to get data on. This might 
be due to exporters being reluctant to hand out “their secret” of how to grow the best 
cocoa. 
Figure 10 Investment mapping 
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If one follows the 
general logic of the 
capitalist peace, one 
might look for an 
overlap between 
investment locations 
and conflict locations. 
In order to get an 
overview over the 
most conflict affected 
areas I first cross-
checked the smaller 
scale events, such as 
riots, strikes and 
protests documented 
in the Social Conflict 
Event Dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012) with the investment locations. For Côte d’Ivoire, 
the dataset contains 316 entries sorted by level of escalation, approximate location and 
possible number of 
deaths (see Figure 
11). SCAD indicates 
that the spots with the 
largest escalations 
were in Abidjan and 
west of Bouake, in 
Vallee du Bandama. 
The deadliest events, 
measured via number 
of people killed per 
event, however are 
more dispersed. These 
Figure 11 Investment and Conflict mapping with SCAD data 
Figure 12 Investment and Conflict mapping with GED data 
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are illustrated through orange circles corresponding to the number of deaths reported. 
Apart from Abidjan and the locations close to Bouake, the data further reveals high 
mortality rates in the coastal areas in Sud Bandama and Lagunes, as well as further 
north close to Duekoue.  
 My second source was the GED geo-referenced conflict dataset (see Figure 12). 
The conflict spots are again highlighted in orange, with circles proportional to the 
amount of people killed. The distribution of conflict locations here is a bit different 
than the SCAD data reveals. Apart from clashes in Abidjan that were smaller in their 
intensity level, the main conflict sites are along the Liberian border and along the 
“zone de confiance” around Guiglo, north of Daloa and around Bouake.  
When reviewing the locations of investment projects in relation to the conflict 
spots, one can see that investment does not seem to focus on former conflict hotspots. 
This is regardless of the level of violence. Both lower level (SCAD) and higher level 
(GED) event data (Sundberg et al. 2010)reveals that post-2011 investment in cocoa is 
not directed to conflict-affected areas. This could be interpreted as a “shying away” 
from conflict provinces, similar to the findings from Shaw and Mbabazi (2007) on the 
dual development of Uganda. One can argue along the same lines and claim that 
different parts of Côte d’Ivoire are targeted according to their status on the market - 
increasing investment in areas with lower conflict history and main infrastructural 
importance, such as the Daloa-San Pedro road, versus a general ignorance of main 
areas of conflict, namely along the Liberian border. The only area where there is a 
stronger overlap between the investment projects and conflict intensity is the area 
south of Duekoue, where investment in school buildings is located. However since 
these projects are part of a more “charitable” or CSR approach, one might still hold on 
to the dual-development explanation, since social infrastructure might not be a symbol 
for integration into the global market. Considering possible changes of the investment 
activities over the time in relation to conflict locations, only the Nestle Cocoa Plan is 
relevant.65 In the course of the programme, there is a move away from Sud Bandama 
and Moyen Cavally, going towards the north into Marahoue, Dix-Huit-Montagnes and 
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65 This is due to the fact that this is the only data that is in time-series cross-sectional format, which 
allows us to make assumptions over time and space.  
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Savanes. This might indicate an increased spread of social revenues towards the 
former buffer zone in order to increase the peace dividends beyond the cocoa-belt. 
4.3 Reconciliation vs. reconstruction?    
There is not much large-scale data available to investigate the state of reconciliation. 
One of the few sources is the Afrobarometer (Penar & Mukana 2013) survey, which 
interviewed 1200 households in 2013 on a range of issues. I re-ran the national results 
by region and saw some interesting trends. A majority of 60% thought that instead of 
general amnesty, perpetrators should be taken to court first. This opinion was largely 
the same throughout the country, but received some more support in southern regions 
like Lagunes and Lacs. This might allude to a lack of reconciliation, because most 
respondents argue that gaining justice is more important than overall reconciliation. 
That being said, it is very difficult to draw conclusions based on these Afrobarometer 
questions, both because they take no account of what issues like amnesty and 
forgiveness really entail, as well as the questions on the reconciliation process, which 
seem rather indecisive to begin with. 
Because the survey data alone is not sufficient, I chronologically reviewed 
expert and news reports in a second step. In its March 2011 edition, the International 
Conflict Group (ICG) (2011c) is very negative when describing the general 
uncertainty prior to the capture of Gbagbo. They expect the “disintegration of society 
and rapid decline of all its institutions” in the following years. This rather pessimistic 
evaluation was not shared by all observers (Cook 2011b; Cook 2011a). Cook (2011a) 
argues for good chances of a swift recovery after economic activity and basic security 
are back on track (ibid., p.11). In a footnote, ICG indicates that the South-West and far 
West were the main hotspots of unrest, beatings, destruction of goods and killings 
during the crisis (ICG 2011c, p.13).66 The report argues further that national security is 
endangered due to the cocoa sanctions because they were damaging the economy 
further (ICG 2011c, p.6; BBC 2011l). The capturing of Gbagbo (BBC 2011k; BBC 
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66 They mention reports from Dignago (Fromager), Garango (Marahoué), Niboua (Haut Sassandra), 
Korhogo (Savanes), Daoukro (N’zi Comoé); Vongoué (18 Montagnes) as well as “In the extreme 
west, the country’s most unstable region, clashes have taken on an extra dimension as communities 
have fought each other, notably in Duékoué, where at least 14 people have been killed” (ICG 2011c, 
p.14). 
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2011h) did nothing to stop human rights abuses or lessen the cross-border attacks 
(HRW 2011; BBC 2011i; BBC 2011m).  
The August 2011 assessment from ICG focuses much more on long-term 
reconciliation (ICG 2011a, p.3) and mentions the problem of winner’s justice and an 
increase in “ethnic imbalance” in positions of power (ICG 2011a, p.10). This is an 
aspect re-iterated in a number of reports (HRW 2011), especially in reference to the 
arrests of former ministers and allies of Gbagbo (BBC 2011g; BBC 2011k). The ICG 
already points out that Dix-Huit Montagnes and Moyen Cavally are the regions most 
critical in need of reconciliation measures. ICG further mentions the need to create 
reconciliation by economic means, by injecting international funds and loans into 
labour-intensive activities in order to “quickly occupy the poorly educated sectors of 
the male population, diverting them from using weapons and crime” (ICG 2011a, p.19; 
Zounmenou 2011).67  
The last ICG report for 2011 depicts a slight improvement in the reconciliations 
status (ICG 2011b),68 arguing that the new government made “significant 
improvement in governance and more efficient management of economy and public 
funds” (ICG 2011b, p.6). However ICG outlines an economic focus on urban areas 
and not in the regions most affected by the crisis, namely Moyen Cavally and Bas-
Sassandra. This argument supports the impression from the investment-conflict geo-
referencing, that economic activities have not targeted the most conflict-affected areas. 
The report further mentions that despite the return of international and national 
investment, important underlying political, regional and ethnic tensions are still 
present.69  
The main messages from 2011 reverberate in the 2012 ICG report (ICG 2012). 
The biggest task for national stability is reconciliation, which still remains neglected. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 “It is crucial for a country to have a coherent post-conflict economic management strategy that 
identifies the challenges affecting the vital economic and financial systems in Côte d’Ivoire – 
including the cocoa, coffee and oil sectors, which have been cripples by corruption and 
mismanagement” (Zounmenou 2011, p.37). 
68 “In six months, the present administration has done what the previous government was not able to 
do in a decade” (ICG 2011b, p.6).  
69 “However, these promising economic signs, which will hopefully result in the creation of jobs for 
the young people whose careers have been sacrificed during the last two decades, are not enough to 
guarantee lasting stability” (ibid., p.7). 
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The ICG cautions that the slow progress on reintegration of former combatants might 
endanger the transition into a civil economy (ICG 2012, p.3).70 ICG underlines that the 
agency for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ADDR) needs to be more 
realistic in their assessments and timelines (ICG 2012, p.10). Furthermore, the report 
mentions that the government does see reconciliation as one of its top priorities (ICG 
2012, p.21). Further problems with the integration of Gbagbo’s troops into the national 
army are apparent (HRW 2012, p.9), which arguably led to an increase in insecurity 
and frequent attacks in the West. Report on cross-border raids from Liberia (BBC 
2012a) and Ghana (BBC 2012b) as well as frequent violence in Abidjan (BBC 2012d; 
BBC 2012c) raised concerns. The mistrust of the opposition continued due to the 
delivery of Gbagbo to the ICC (BBC 2012e) as human rights abuses and impunity 
continue (HRW 2012; ICG 2012, p.16 f).71 
 From 2013 onwards, concerns over the government’s attention on economic 
reconstruction were more pronounced, arguing for more focus on reconciliatory 
policies (Ford 2013; Boutellis 2013; HRW 2013a).72 In light of exhumations of mass 
graves and disproportionate numbers of court cases against Gbagbo supporters, issues 
of impunity received more attention (BBC 2013b; HRW 2013b).73 
The last ICG report from 2014 is focused on the Western regions of Moyen 
Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes. It reiterates the message of former ICG assessments 
of grave shortcomings in reconciliation efforts. This is due to the economic focus on 
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70 “According to the former president of the National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, 97,000 armed 
men are awaiting demobilisation. They are divided into three groups: the first is composed of 32,000 
ex-FN soldiers who, at one time or another, were in the rebel forces; the second is composed of 36,000 
auxiliaries recruited by the FN during the post electoral crisis; and the third is composed of 38,000 
members of militias and self-defence groups created under the former regime” (ICG 2012, p.9). 
71 Human Rights Watch, for example, reports from a detention camp for the military in Abidjan 
quoting one detainee: “How does the government expect reconciliation when the FRCI steal from us, 
treat us all as militiamen, [and] do daily mass arrests? I have nothing left now, all my money was 
taken or [used to pay for my release]. If someone asks me tomorrow to pick up a gun and fight the 
FRCI, I don’t know what I will say. When people have been stripped of everything, when all we are 
left with is hatred ... we’re a long way from reconciliation” (HRW 2012, p.60). 
72 “’The reconstruction is relatively easy compared to reconciliation’, said Guigale. ‘You build a 
bridge, the question is whether all parties and all segments of society want to cross that bridge’” (Ford 
2013). 
73 “Two and a half years after the post-electoral crisis, the national cohesion remains the priority of the 
leaders in Côte d’Ivoire. ‘The social dimension of the cocoa sector is so important that decisions are 
more responsive to political and economic concerns,’ confirms an operator” (Africa Up Close 2013).  
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the centres while the most critical regions are in need of serious investment.74 Looking 
more closely at the three important factors that destabilise these two Western regions, 
the report mentions the importance of agriculture and criticises the legal uncertainties 
of land rights.75 The report argues that the national situation has improved since 2013 
(ICG 2014, p.21) with reconciliation still being challenged by impunity (BBC 2014a; 
Ozoukou 2014; Kobo 2014; Kouamé Remi 2015) and lacks efforts in re-integration 
(BBC 2014d). 
One employee of the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) that I talked to, 
mentioned the fundamental lack of reconciliation in the country. While there are great 
improvements in the urban infrastructure he said, people in the North were getting 
frustrated because they expected more from Ouattara.76 He stressed that the current 
perception of a “winner’s justice” is toxic to the peace-project.  
The review of these reports on reconciliation offers a few interesting aspects. 
First and foremost is there a noticeable contradiction between the human rights 
advocates who criticise the mono-focused efforts of the government on economy, 
while at the same time arguing that the most conflict-affected areas still need 
investment. As I alluded to before, I perceive similarities with the Ugandan case by 
Shaw and Mbabazi (2007), arguing for a cynical idea of the capitalist peace. The fact 
that the West continues to be an unstable region, while security in the economic 
centres is re-instated, is an especially interesting point. The overall canon is that 
economic recovery is overestimated and that serious reconciliation should be the 
primary focus of the government. There is a high degree of criticism when it comes to 
efforts on reintegration of combatants as well. This echoes the critical remarks of 
MacGinty and Richmond (2007), who argue that capitalist peace theory is good at 
achieving countable results but is not as good at reconciling.  
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74 “There has not been much public investment in infrastructure. There are two general hospitals in 
Guiglo and Duékoué, few tarmacked roads, only one court, recently refurbished, recurring problems 
with access to drinking water, etc. Private investment in infrastructure has been equally low” (ICG 
2014, p.14). 
75 The law of 1998 established that “foreigners” are not supposed to own land, but this legislation is 
seldom executed. The existence of traditional land usage systems further complicates the issue (ICG 
2014, p.9). 
76 This ONUCI officer argued that Ouattara is mainly increasing infrastructure in Abidjan due to the 
large amounts of voters he could win there.  
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4.4 Sweet capitalist peace?  
!
In order to go even deeper and to evaluate the four main assumptions of the capitalist 
peace theory, I will review the expert interviews.  
4.4.1 Transformation of behaviour   
!
The first assumption mentioned by Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) is “based on a 
hedonistic understanding of human nature and argues that capitalism alters human 
behaviour and transforms belligerent individuals (…) into peace-loving consumers, 
traders and business people” (2013, p.3). According to Mousseau (2000) and cultural 
materialism:  
“individuals in developed market economies tend to share the social and 
political values of exchange-based cooperation, individual choice and free will, 
negotiation and compromise, universal equity among individuals, and universal 
trust in the sanctity of contract, then individuals in developed market economies 
tend to share democratic values” (ibid., p.479).  
These market/capitalist values should accordingly impact the individual norms and 
contribute to a lessening of violence.   
 During my research and fieldwork it was rather difficult to find evidence for 
this argument. There are some indications that the values of free markets have been 
strengthened. The Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (BTI) (2014) for 
example, outlines that the government has been successful in combating illicit 
activities and smuggling, which thrived during the civil war. And “despite sluggish 
progress, donors have invested considerable efforts in creating a more welcoming 
environment for small and medium-size enterprises” (ibid., p.13). This could be an 
indicator that the increased inflow of international capital is able to reverse some illicit 
activities and increase a formal business culture in Côte d’Ivoire. However when 
looking at indicators like the Frazer Institute Economic Freedom Indicator used by De 
Soysa (2012), Côte d’Ivoire ranges in the mid-field with a 6.0 of 10.0 (Frazer Institute 
2012).77 The index has remained at the same level during the last decade, which might 
indicate that individuals have the same market norms as they had before 2011. 
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77 The Indicator ranges from 0 to 10, representing “total economic freedom”. 
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During my fieldwork I was often confronted with the idea of “moving on” and getting 
“back on track” to the pre-war status. In Blokosso, one of the Gbagbo-areas in 
Abidjan, our landlord expressed his views concerning the presidential elections later 
this year and his hopes that Ouattara would win again, due to the progress he made: 
“He is not from my party at all, but the president does things right”. This entails for 
example the construction of a third bridge in Abidjan, increases in public wages and 
the construction of a new highway to the North. Not unlike other post-conflict 
countries, people in Côte d’Ivoire seem to be (superficially) reconciled with their 
destiny and positive about the economic improvements. From my fieldwork I got the 
impression that this kind of “moving on” mentality connects with the business culture 
that has been present since independence. However it did not seem as if this mentality 
and wish for peace was something entirely new that emerged after the country was re-
established on the global market, since some Ivorians had plenty of time being traders 
and consumers since independence, but did, as highlighted in the background chapter, 
instead decide to involve themselves in the conflict. 
Most Ivorians I talked to do not even speak of the period between 2000-2011 as 
a civil war or conflict but rather refer to it as “the political-military crisis”.78 I often got 
the impression that people viewed it as a hiccup of an otherwise functioning economy, 
which should be overcome instead being dwelled upon. One of the cocoa 
programming experts mentioned: “One should simply move on”.79 He thought it was 
important to integrate ex-combatants swiftly in agriculture and other sectors, but that 
they should not be continuously singled out. For now, he said, the justice sector should 
do whatever it needs to do, but society at large does not profit from these kinds of 
differentiations.80 When I asked the implementing expert whether he thought that 
investment projects such as farmer business education contributed to reconciliation, he 
agreed and underlined that these projects increase the welfare of the farmers, which 
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78 The governments national development agues that “serious political instability” lasted from 1999 
until May 2011(Gov CDI 2012b, p.3). 
79 French: “on peut avance”. 
80 This was further supported by the CCC-expert I talked to, who stressed that the young farmers 
initiative targets young demographics at risk and not specifically ex-combatants “The programs 
contribute to the integration of young people at risk in the communities”. 
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helps in keeping the peace.81 From my point of view this “moving on” attitude might 
however indicate that certain business values existed before the conflict. Combatants 
just need to get back into the business world in order to properly exercise these values, 
but have not changed them. I think, however, that they do to some extent support 
Mousseau’s (2010; 2012) argument on market-linked actors. He claims that a large 
number of market actors constitute the electorate and hence influence the government 
to prioritize economic policies instead of security.  
The issue of re-integration is especially interesting in the context of that first 
argument of transformed behaviour. One security expert I consulted was very sceptical 
of the demobilisation project and argued that “the nasty guys are not on the list of the 
ADDR” underlining that those most involved in the conflict are scattered in the 
forests, hiding out in Liberia and Ghana and waiting for their signal to return. He 
argued that people, especially in the West and around Gagnoa, have no interest in 
handing over their guns or returning to civil life. Another security expert pointed out 
that the reintegration of the remaining fighters is especially tricky:  
“They cannot read, they cannot count. This last phase of reintegration touches a 
population that is simply not qualified to fill in any position in the 
administration and other sectors”.  
So, even though some ex-combatants who were not integrated into the business culture 
and the market before the war might want to re-establish themselves in the civil 
economy and “transform” into a peace-loving consumer or trader, they might not have 
the necessary abilities and capacities for such a transformation. This again questions 
whether markets alone have that kind of transformative power. 
This kind of lack of abilities is especially apparent in the case in the cocoa 
sector. Although an expert acknowledged that the government and private investors 
have intentions to integrate young combatants into cocoa farming, most experts I 
asked about the possibilities of that were very reserved. They argued that most former 
combatants were not used to hard work and would rather live from war revenues. One 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 The national development plan and the government sees economic development and growth as the a 
way to “strengthen social cohesion through job creation, particularly for the youth, address the return 
of refugees and internally displaced people” (Gov CDI 2012b, p.10). However the perceive the social 
cohesion, national reconciliation and the normalization of political life as “fundamental determinants 
for the consolidation of s climate of sustainable peace” (ibid., p.10). 
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implementing expert further claimed that these younger men were a lost generation, 
but that “they have been lost long before the war”. Another point mentioned was the 
fact that cocoa requires a lot of prior knowledge, which makes it a trade that is rather 
“inherited” than “taught”: “I do not think they [ex-combatants] could be overnight 
cocoa farmers [since] cocoa is more of a legacy”. It is difficult to enter cocoa farming 
without any ties or family connection in cocoa and indeed for most of the World 
Bank/PAPC reintegration projects in agriculture, ex-combatants have some family 
background in farming. In my view this is very significant regarding the argument of 
transforming behaviour; this kind of reasoning ignores abilities and social 
circumstances that enable transition. Some actors in the market in Côte d’Ivoire might 
be able to “get back on track” and return to the same economic activities as they did 
before the war. But former fighters without the essential knowledge are not easily 
converted just because they are part of the larger market-system. This in turn might 
reflect that the transformational capitalist peace argument is quite difficult to see in the 
real world. Additionally, this ignorance around ability and circumstance indicates a 
lack of understanding of the realities of an individual combatant at large.     
4.4.2 Conditional effect    
!
Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) mention a more critical assumption that regards 
capital markets and the “peacefulness of unregulated markets in certain 
configurations” (ibid., p.3). They state for example that the existence of democratic 
governance or reasonably high levels of human development need to be in place in 
order for capitalism to have a pacifying effect. I find that this argument is the most 
difficult one to evaluate, since it touches upon the issues of endogeneity mentioned in 
the method part. If both the level of development and democratic structures are 
necessary in order to ensure the capitalist peace, it is extremely difficult to review as 
an individual factor.  
One might argue that parts of the reform of the cocoa sector is one of such 
configurations that makes the capitalist peace work in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa. As 
outlined in the background chapter, one of the first measures was to reconstruct a 
major cocoa organisation, the CCC, to set the prices and regulate the market. The 
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reform is heavily supported by the CCC field-agents who travel around co-operatives 
and announce the seasonal price. One private company expert remarked that the CCC 
is “surprisingly” active and not limited to acting as centralised administration. This is 
not only to spread the real price amongst farmers but also to control illicit cocoa trade 
by patrolling the border to Ghana. Two professions further argued that regulations in 
the cocoa market make it now much more competitive and open for new actors. One 
claimed that the CCC implements cocoa limits for each exporter, which in turn opens 
up more competition amongst the established firms and allows smaller chocolate 
producers to enter the market. This might indicate that the democratic state has 
established the CCC-structure, which is able to create the circumstances in which the 
capitalist peace works, namely to distribute the cocoa wealth towards farmers, instead 
of increasing inequalities.  
However, one major contrast the argument of global capitalisation is that a large 
part of the cocoa reform is the installation of state-controlled marketing and pricing 
(BTI 2014, p.21).82 The pre-seasonal fixing of prices (for example CFA 1847 per kg in 
January to March) makes it easier for farmers to understand what their cocoa is worth. 
The system also secures a minimal price for cocoa, which was put at CFA 850 per 
kilogram for the 2015-16 season. 
This should make it impossible for 
the middlemen or pisteurs, to buy 
cocoa below the minimal price of 
EUR 1.30.  
The setting of the price is 
remarked as one of the positive 
aspects of the cocoa reform of 2011, firstly because it increased the income of farmers 
and secondly because it increased transparency in the whole value chain. As one 
expert put it: “The farmers are happier now, because they know when they are being 
cheated”. Another implementing expert mentioned how much cocoa farmers suffered 
during the last decade due to the liberalised price. He argued that the low price was 
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82 “The Ouattara government is considered to be a staunch defender of a liberal economy, but its 
actions thus far have been quite mainstream and have strengthened state intervention” (BTI 2014, 
p.21). 
Picture 2 Fixed cocoa price for 2014/15 
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why so many farmers had to cut corners and employ children (see also Alongi 2011; 
Bøås & Huser 2006). The WCF expert exemplified this claim with the story of a small 
cocoa community he began to visit in 2013:  
“When I came there first, very few people were driving around in cars or motor 
bikes. Now, in the same community, I see a lot of motorbikes, people are 
mobile and have more money to buy things”.83  
I would argue that the stable price has had a large effect on whether people perceive 
that they can live from the cocoa trade or not. I think it is however noteworthy that 
these kinds of state-interventionist policies are not part of the capitalists’ assumptions 
but instead go back to a strongly state-controlled economy. As outlined earlier it is 
difficult to assess the second argument, since it does not provide a proper causal chain 
of explanation. This might be a further indication that the capitalist peace model is 
strongly rooted in a traditional Western capitalist framework. 
4.4.3 Property rights protection    
!
Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) claim that capitalist economies are more effective and 
uphold contract and property rights especially, which in turn should make these 
countries more peaceful. This is the aspect that is most difficult to pin down for the 
Ivorian example because it assumes a highly codified system for land rights and 
contracts that is applicable for all regions of the country. For Côte d’Ivoire however, 
the customary land systems like the tutorat and land titles attributed under Boigny, 
Bédie and Gbagbo (BTI 2014, p.15) represent a Pandora’s box of disputes. One 
grinding expert noticed that when on certification visits, he often experiences that the 
farmer he finds on the field claiming to own the plantation is not the same as the one 
registered, or that the real owner does not have a clue about the plantation.  
Two implementing experts further mentioned that the discussion with local 
communities and evaluation of impacts of an investment project was important before 
the start in order not to “accidentally increase tensions”. The experts argued that in the 
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83 It is however interesting that some of the steps that have been taken in the Ouattara government, 
might actually have their roots in the policy action taken from Gbagbo. As Guesnet et al (2009) point 
out  were problems with cocoa pricing and quality were already noticed in 2008, which led to some 
efforts to make the sector more transparent. However the report also notices that the improvements 
made thus far did not show a lot. 
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majority of the cocoa belt, land rights and title disputes have not been solved after the 
crisis and remain still “a major problem for investment in the cocoa sector”. Such 
disputes are often connected with ethnic struggles, as one other expert reports. He 
recalls an incident from 2014 in the Sassandra area, where a co-operative of mostly 
“foreigners” (namely Mossi/ Burkinabe) wanted to use their surplus from cocoa 
trading to build a health centre.84 He remembers that the co-operative tried to buy land 
for this project over months, but were denied every time. “It is fascinating how 
problematic it was. People did not want the investment of the Dioula co-operative 
even if it was for everyone to use”. The cooperative was able eventually able to 
acquire land a couple of kilometres outside the community, but it was apparently more 
important to block the project from the “foreigners” than to build something that 
everybody could use. He agrees: “in this incident, our programme has no effect on 
reuniting anyone”.85 In my view this third argument is a major aspect in evaluating the 
capitalist peace for Côte d’Ivoire, since it again illustrates that the causal reasoning of 
the capitalist peace is largely build on the Western state model as critically mentioned 
by Willett (2005) and Taylor (2007). This third argument might work in some 
countries, but automatically disqualifies economies like Côte d’Ivoire, which have 
been globally integrated, but lack such a highly codified property framework.  
4.4.4 Signalling accountability    
!
The last argument (Schneider & Gleditsch 2013) claims “that capitalist economies are 
better able to signal their resolve than closed economies”. In my understanding, this 
should contribute to more accountability and credibility because capitalist economies 
need to signal that they are well-functioning in order to attract international investors 
and creditors.  
 A first aspect that this argument might help to explain is why the government 
not only seeks to re-capture their traditional French investors (BBC 2014c) but aims at 
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84 A lot of the private companies social infrastructure projects are supported by the cooperatives they 
work with, their earned surpluses and then some contribution from the cocoa exporter/ manufacturers 
in question.  
85 One expert said, that agriculture (and cocoa) has great potential reuniting the country due to its 
effects on a number of levels, but since there is not a lot of land and cocoa is the main dominating 
crop, it gets difficult.   
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a broader investor audience. This is indicated in the High Level Prosperity Partnership 
with the UK, which started in 2013 to increase economic cooperation in key areas. 
This increased investor audience could explain why the UK government sees “notable 
advancements in trade freedom and fiscal freedom”(Gov UK 2014).86 Other indicators 
like the World Bank’s Distance to Frontiers score further shows steady improvements 
when it comes to the ease of doing business. One can see Côte d’Ivoire performing 
better and decrease the costs for exports (World Bank 2015). Some reviews credit the 
international donors and organisations (namely the World Bank, EU, IMF) for those 
improvements, arguing that they demanded reforms to ensure a “more transparent and 
competitive economic environment” (Grauer 2015, p.9). This would partly be 
explained by the signalling argument. As mentioned in the investment overview, the 
government puts in some serious efforts in order to convince international capital to 
(re-) invest in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Another issue that might be explained by this assumption is the combating of 
corruption in Côte d’Ivoire. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) in Figure 13 shows a slight increase of the index, which reflects that less 
corruption is perceived since 2011 (Transparency International 2014). 
!
Figure 13 Corruption Perception Index for Côte d'Ivoire 
From 1998 onwards, the country’s CPI decreased gradually to 1.9 at its lowest during 
the pre-crisis years. Côte d’Ivoire hit rock-bottom in terms of corruption perception in 
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86 Though these have been said to being somewhat reduced due to decrease in rule of law (measuring 
property rights) and freedom from corruption.  
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2005 when it was almost last out of the whole ranking.87 Being officially proclaimed 
as a top priority of the government,88 anti-corruption efforts lack actions against 
“former rebel leaders who accumulated wealth during the military occupation of the 
north” (BTI 2014, p.20). Throughout the years critics have argued that “clientelistic 
tendencies in the economy”, especially in cocoa, need to be tackled (ibid., p.24). The 
government has improved certain practices, making the use of resources more efficient 
as well as improving access on available information about resource revenues for the 
budgetary process (BTI 2014, p.20; Grauer 2015, p.10). Reports further underline that 
the guaranteed price has “proved its capacity to better distribute the wealth of the 
network” (Africa Up Close 2013). Furthermore, the government created a showcase in 
court with the so-called “cocoa barons” that embezzled revenues on a large scale and 
led to the sentencing of 15 former top officials of cocoa (BBC 2013a). All these 
indications could be explained by the fourth assumption of the capitalist peace that 
cocoa is becoming less corrupt and more transparent in order to attract investors, 
which might mitigate some violence.  
A third important aspect that might be covered by this argument is the issue of 
corporate responsibility.89 There is an increasing effort from the business-NGO 
networks to expand transparency and accountability rooted in the scandals surrounding 
child labour in the cocoa plantations.90 One expert said that the companies are more 
active in improving farmers’ livelihoods and that there is a growing interest in “the 
living conditions of the farmers”. This is an understanding of the value chain which 
apparently did not exist earlier. He underlined that exporters had been reluctant to 
invest in social infrastructure such as schools projects, but that this has now changed. 
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87 The Corruption Perception Index ranges from 0 ‚very corrupt’ to 10 (since 2012: 100) ‚very clean’; 
in 2005 Côte d’Ivoire scored as 152nd country out of 158. 
88 “A national plan for good governance and fight against corruption was set up in 2013 and is 
supervised by the High Authority for Good Governance – which is effective since September 2014 
and the National Secretariat for governance and capacity building” (Gov UK 2014).  
89 “Companies are not required under Ivorian law to disclose information regarding to corporate social 
responsibility, although many companies, especially in the cocoa sector, do publicize work they have 
done in these areas on their websites” (Grauer 2015, p.13). “’There is a moral obligation’, said Gilbert 
Kone Kafana, minister for labour and social affairs. ’The chocolate companies have a duty to engage 
with us. We need to build roads, schools, hospitals and social centres; anything that would allow Ivory 
Coast to progress” (Hawksley 2011). 
90 The issue of child labour has been a very sensitive topic in most of the expert and focus group 
interviews. There further a lot of media and governmental attention on the topic. 
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The CCC expert argued along similar lines, saying that she witnessed a slight change 
in motives. There has been a lot of “bad press” for chocolate enterprises and 
manufacturers due to the “the media commercialising of child labour”, she said. This 
negative attention has raised firms’ awareness of social considerations in their value 
chain, sustainability and transparency. It might be due to this newly found 
understanding of social responsibility that manufacturers are becoming increasingly 
aware and document sustainability projects on their websites.91 One might however 
argue that this does not equal with widespread transparency in locations where 
companies are involved in cocoa projects. I would indeed argue that this kind of 
argumentation only works for “softer” issues that are highly emotional, such as child 
labour.  
 Even though there are major improvements in the area of accountability, I could 
still notice the general opaqueness surrounding cocoa revenue that has been mentioned 
before 2011 (see Global Witness 2007; ICG 2004; Losch 2003; Kuklinski & Adhuze 
2013). This makes it difficult to follow the fourth argument in its generalist nature. 
One expert for a cocoa-programming organisation put it fittingly: “Asking questions 
about cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire is like asking questions about oil in Dubai”. This was a 
problem that I experienced throughout my fieldwork, especially in regard to data 
collection for the investment mapping. Almost all private partners, foreign and 
governmental organisations active in cocoa are reluctant to hand out any information 
on projects, especially their locations. A couple of projects are visible online and in the 
field, but most of the investment sites are hidden. When asking experts directly on the 
locations of their projects, most were evasive, rather general or said right out that those 
locations were part of the companies’ or organisations’ classified information.  
One example that illustrates these non-transparent practices is the presentation by the 
WCF on their ‘Echoes’ programme line. The WCF, the major actor in private-NGO 
cooperation, entertains some projects on their own, some with private partners as 
previously outlined. I would expect a large number of projects in the world’s largest 
cocoa export nation. On their webpage however, the WCF only indicates the locations 
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91 Though again there is mostly little specific information, very little is being reflected on the actual 
content or location of the project.  
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of 22 projects, 13 of which 
are essentially in the same 
community. This seems 
odd, especially in 
comparison to the WCF 
activities in neighbouring 
Ghana, where 404 national 
sites are located. However 
the presentation of the 
WCF project is also in 
contrast to the organisation’s own statements. According to their own website, WCF 
Echoes “currently supports 38 communities in the regions of Haut Sassandra, Moyen 
Comoé, Agnéby, Moyen Cavally Region, and Sud Bandama of Côte d’Ivoire (...)” 
(World Cocoa Foundation 2015). Again this does not add up with openly available 
project sites. It was by coincidence, that I came by one of these few indicated project 
locations (see Picture 3) which was a rare occasion where I saw open advertisement 
for cocoa investment. This just underlines the aforementioned point; it is hard to track 
down investment projects and their locations in the field. Indeed the difficulty of 
getting access to data on such as large scale seems to support, as previously 
mentioned, considerations of clientelistic networks seeking to keep information 
concealed. In my view this difficulty in accessing all information necessary for 
analysis, might be another argument against the capitalist peace’s assumptions. As 
mentioned earlier, many exporters like to keep their investment activities rather non-
transparent because they would otherwise risk losing large revenues, which in the end 
seem like another indication against the capitalist peace logic. 
A second aspect I found is the persistence of corruption in the sector. Some of 
the reports on the cocoa sector post-2011 are very critical of the fact that there has 
been no independent audit on cocoa and oil (BTI 2014). As well as underlining that 
though the sentencing of the so-called “cocoa-barons” in itself is a good sign, it is 
however argued that this arrest did not result from a systemic anti-corruption approach 
(ibid. p.20). It is further worth mentioning that the process against these illicit 
Picture 3 WCF project in Zibouyaokro 
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networks already started during the government of Gbagbo, after he ordered the 
“investigation into allegations of widespread corruption in the coffee and cocoa 
sector” (BBC 2013a) in 2008. One expert claimed that the CCC expects large bribes 
for the awarding of export licences to the exporter and that transparency is limited. He 
further highlighted the importance of cocoa as the government’s main revenue 
resource,92 and could therefore not see any incentive for the state or the private 
companies to really increase transparency. When asked about the unexpected speed of 
the cocoa reform, another expert answered that Ouattara “had to get hold of the main 
cash point, the cocoa, quickly”.  
This continued corruption is apparently also noticeable in the newly unified 
CCC. One of the programme experts mentioned that the branding of the cocoa 
marketing entity does not really matter. He argued that the marketing system of cocoa 
is very complicated, which gives the cocoa administrators the power of being highly 
specialised and nearly irreplaceable. Therefore he guessed that only the name had 
altered, while the administration was more or less unchanged. One other 
implementation expert mentioned that the revenue-extraction happened through a 
number of small organisations before the reform. Today, the government and industry 
only interacts with one organisation, the CCC, which indicated in his eyes a kind of 
“pseudo-transparency” in the sector. Not even that is done rigorously, as the CCC 
headquarters in Abidjan nicely illustrate (see Picture 4). Still being called the ‘Maison 
de CAISTAB’ (the CAISTAB house), with floor plans indicate the multitude of 
Gbagbo’s cocoa institution while the “new” CCC staff steer the cocoa sector from 
there. One might argue that an administration that cannot be bothered to change the 
name on their floor plans might essentially remain the unchanged, also on the inside. 
This persistence of old corrupt structures might be something that Taylor (2007) 
would call the sabotage of the capitalist peace by African patterns of clientelism.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 He was arguing that 58% of the cocoa revenues are collected by the state, while some reports only 
talk of 22% of the country’s GDP (AFP 2015). 
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4.5 Conclusion: “On peut avance!”    
!
In this chapter I reviewed assumptions of the capitalist peace theory for the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire. By first outlining the sector and the low starting base after the crisis in 
2011, I established the insight that investment increased (see Aid Data 2014; 
Yembiline et al. 2014; Alby 2014; Monnier 2014) and looked into evidence from 
investment-conflict mapping, reports and survey results as well as my interview 
material.  
 I want to discuss several main issues for the Ivorian case. First is the reiterated 
claim of an increasing tension between economic reconstruction and reconciliation. As 
the thriving business nation that Côte d’Ivoire essentially is, and surely was before the 
civil war, one could argue that economic measures and growth for the country are (for 
now) what it takes in order to satisfy the nation. As Ivorians from both side of the 
country admit, they want to move on (“on peut avance”), as they are mainly tired of 
being used by the politicians. It could be further argued that reconciliation still is an 
issue “too fresh” and sensitive, especially when it comes to integrating more people 
into the competitive landscape of cocoa land disputes. However, I think it is worth 
noticing that the majority of international observers want a post-conflict economy like 
Picture 4 The CCC headquarters or “Maison de CAISTAB”? 
 ! 73 
Côte d’Ivoire to immediately switch tracks. Knowing that reconciliation takes time, I 
would argue that an economic jump-start might not be such a bad idea. 
Secondly, I observe strong neutrality from the cocoa exporters towards 
reconciliation and re-integration. That is almost a bit surprising, since one of the main 
underlying problems is the remaining issue of land rights. As mentioned previously, 
the type of land rights system influences the production of cocoa to such a high degree 
that such neutrality seems rather strange.  
 Regarding the capitalist peace assumptions, I want to outline some issues. 
Firstly, I think that the assumption of the transformative power of capitalist liberalism 
on individuals is quite odd concerning the case of Côte d’Ivoire. Cocoa trade has long 
been part of the capitalist market. However, people decided to take up weapons, and at 
least partially neglect their cocoa fields. I think this questions the power the market has 
over an individual, and further questions how much can the market can change 
abilities and socio-economic conditions for combatants.  
A second aspect I think is interesting is the aspect of state intervention and 
which issues the government chooses to address. The capitalist peace argues for 
example that property rights are more respected in capitalist systems. This is quite 
strikingly not the case in Côte d’Ivoire, although one may argue that the complicated 
mixture of customary land laws, ethnic affiliations and old regulations make it 
impossible to declare land rights sensible, let alone enforce them. However, it shows 
that this assumption might not have validity for all capitalist economies, especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The state in the Ivorian case is however involved in the setting of 
the prices for cocoa, which is overall a positive aspect. Again this is in contrast to the 
capitalist peace assumptions.  
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Picture 5 The UN convoy: One of the few reminders of war in Abidjan 
Thirdly, the assumption on transparency and accountability attracting investors does 
not seem to be adequate. Up to a certain degree, accountability might be something 
that investors are interested in, first and foremost regarding corruption. However, I 
would argue that private businesses are not interested in accountability on all fronts 
because it would most likely increase the prices for products, due to better labour 
standards, fair competition, etc. I would further argue that unless investors are forced 
to change, like in the example of child labour, the costs of transparency are too high.  
In my view, this case is at least in part explained by the capitalist peace assumptions. 
However, the theory lacks an individual perspective on issues of ability and a more 
locally applicable understanding of land rights and African capitalism. As mentioned 
above, does it not explain adequately why a person who could earn money through 
war would be transformed by participating in the global market. In my view the 
explanation needs to consider how these people can be reintegrated and how the 
existing cocoa farmers might remain peaceful by having improved livelihoods and 
possibilities for work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! 75 
Chapter 5. Regional analysis  
!
As outlined previously the capitalist peace theory attempts to explain cases from a 
macro-level. In order to evaluate the research question further I from a more individual 
perspective I will review the impact of investment on three parameters (increased job 
creation, improved livelihoods and integration of ex-combatants), which are based on 
the peace-building literature.   
 
5.1 Fromager – the region of Cocoa and Gbagbo 
!
As outlined in Chapter 1, I chose Fromager in the heart of the so-called cocoa belt as a 
case region, because of its conflict history and its investment activity (see 1.4). There 
is very little regional data 
that can help to evaluate 
the impact of investment 
on job creation, improved 
livelihood and re-
integration of ex-
combatants and their 
impact on reconciliation. 
Some reports and data 
can however offer a first 
insight into the region.  
Fromager is considered 
the “homeland” of the 
Bété. The region was a strong support base for Gbagbo in the 2011 elections, where he 
gathered 67.10% of the vote (CEI 2011). Looking into the regional investment data 
that I collected, it reveals that the area has been targeted by some projects. As can be 
seen in Figure 14 there are a number of investment locations north of Gagnoa, 
highlighted in blue, green and yellow. These are mostly focused on constructing 
schools and projects to increase cocoa quality and quantity. Fromager also counts a 
Figure 14 Investment and conflict locations in Fromager 
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number of incidents of political violence according to SCAD (orange).93 In fact, there 
are quite a number of overlaps here between capital investment and conflict events. 
Most of these incidents date back to 2004 and include gang killings after land disputes 
or farmer clashes.94 I further indicated the locations where I conducted my focus group 
interviews, marked with green pins, in Gagnoa; Bayota, north of Gagnoa; Wanéwa, 
south of Gagnoa and Galebre west of Gagnoa. Two of these communities (Bayota and 
Galebre) did not receive any investment, while two others (Wanéwa and Gagnoa) did 
receive investment that was implemented by ANADER.95 There were no registered 
SCAD conflict events in the focus group communities.   
5.1.1 Reports from Fromager 
!
As mentioned earlier, Fromager is one of the regions in the West that is quite often in 
the spotlight due to instability and insecurity. Frequent cross-border attacks from 
Liberia on small villages (BBC 2012a) and land disputes continue to cause tension in 
Fromager. Violence is often connected with activities of the traditional dozos, the 
former protectors of Northern immigrants, who scare people to return to the region 
(BBC 2011a). Former reports of a harmonious mix of ethnicities (James 2009) are 
reversed and Western Côte d’Ivoire is now known for  “some of the country’s most 
brutal violence over the past decade” (Ford 2013). A further problem is that 
“executioners and the victims’ families must today live in the same town and cross 
each other’s paths” (ICG 2014, p.19), which keeps tensions between former 
combatants high.  
The National Assembly’s ten-year extension of the land reform of 2013 that 
allows “immigrants” to own land did nothing to decrease the tensions (Grauer 2015), 
since these rights directly contradict those granted through the 1998-land law, which 
excludes “Northerners” from ownership. Pritchard (2013) outlines for example that 
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93 There are no events in Fromager in the GED data set.  
94 “A gang kills villagers over land dispute” (Oragahio), “Burkinabe and Ivorian farmer clash, killing 
six” (Gagnoa).  
95 This specific programme concentrates public and private actors and organizes farmer business 
schooling focusing on investments, cocoa quality and financial management (Matthess 2014). 
However the following analysis does not seek to evaluate results of the concrete programme, but 
rather uses the exemplified communities in order to look into the perceptions of impact on a general 
scale. 
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69% of the respondents for his study in Guémon and Cavally had first-hand experience 
of land disputes. Contested land rights were due to ecological change, contested 
occupation (re-taking of land) or contested sales (unclear or contested ownership). 
Mitchell (2015; 2013) interviewed 70 cocoa farmers in western Côte d’Ivoire and 
underlines that land conflicts are likely to flare up again. He argues further that 
cooperation with communities is necessary in order to successfully solve land 
disputes. Houngbedji et al (2013) notice a considerable increase in extreme poverty of 
household heads, the level of which is set as US$1.25 per day. This is especially the 
case for Western regions and Fromager. The baseline study by Kuklinski et al (2013) 
offers more insight into Western cocoa communities, for example the town of 
Diegonéfla in Fromager. In one of the few small-scale cocoa studies, Kuklinski et al 
describe how the liberalised pricing system raised mistrust amongst the actors in the 
cocoa value chain (ibid., p.34). They mention that one of their main concerns is the 
progression from subsistence into a more stable economic situation. Their main 
hindrances in overcoming subsistence remain high costs of input like fertilizers, low 
pricing of cocoa and high costs for pest control. In this baseline study, Kuklinski et al 
find that 69% of the farmers perceive their economic situation as stagnant, but are 
surprisingly optimistic about increasing their livelihood.  
What is apparent from the material so far is that Western Côte d’Ivoire 
continues to be instable due to activity of traditional militias, cross-border attacks and 
land disputes. The region remains a hotspot for land disputes, but has been targeted 
with a small amount of investment. Furthermore one can see a decline in economic 
conditions and livelihood throughout the last decade for cocoa farmers in the West and 
particularly in Fromager. Cocoa farmers in Fromager seem to not have been satisfied 
with the cocoa pricing system in order for them to advance beyond subsistence and 
they review the current status as stagnant. This relates to the findings from the national 
analysis that found the liberalised price system to be highly negative for the cocoa 
farmers.  
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5.1.2 Regional Afrobarometer data 
!
The Afrobarometer survey (Penar & Mukana 2013) is one of the few other sources 
available for investigation.96 I did look into some of the regional data, on economic 
realities, perceived top priorities for the government, and government performance as 
well as reconciliation, for the Fromager sample. The majority of respondents (78%) 
were Krou (Bété) and some Baoulé, Akye, Anye (15%). More or less all (73%) 
participated in the 2010/11 elections. The questions on living conditions reveal that 
most respondents in Fromager could satisfy their basic needs during the last year. 
Most of them, for example “never” suffer from: immediate hunger (48%), lack of 
water (55%) or lack of cooking fuel (65%). However, a large number said they “often” 
(38%) or “always” (17.5%) lacked medicine or medical care. An even larger amount 
of recipients argued they “often” (27.5%) or “always” (50%) lacked money during the 
last twelve months.  
Asking what they perceived as the top priority issue for the government, the 
answers were quite diverse. The top three first responses were: economic management 
(15%), job creation (12.5%) and peace and reconciliation (12.5%). Problems that were 
referred to as second priority were: living expenses (22.5%), crime and security 
(12.5%) and peace and reconciliation (12.5%). Third priority was health (20%) and 
water (17.5%). From these priorities, one can see that economic issues receive the 
most importance from the respondents. Although it is difficult to make an adequate 
comparison on livelihood indicators from before the war, respondents seemed to cover 
basic livelihood. However some aspects, such as money and healthcare, created 
discontent amongst the respondents. This was also apparent in their policy choices, 
which indicated that job creation and improvement of livelihood are important topics 
for respondents in Fromager. It is, however, interesting to see how economic measures 
are again perceived as very important. In a region that suffered under insecurity for a 
decade, one might expect crime, security and peace to be more urgent policy issues. 
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96 Of the 1200 participants in the first Afrobarometer survey in Côte d’Ivoire collected in 2013, 40 
participants were questioned in Fromager. This is not a very large sample and therefore not 
representative but might help to highlight some issues from the region.  
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The economic focus of the respondents again reiterates the findings from Chapter 4 
that there is a sense of “moving on” mentality in the country.  
Afrobarometer further surveyed the perceptions of the current government’s 
work, which was rather negative, especially considering efforts of economic 
management where 78% of the Fromager respondents attested bad results. Two issues, 
improvement of living conditions for poor people and job creation, were perceived 
even worse, with 97.5% (!) responding that the government was making insufficient 
efforts. This might be due to the high number of Bété respondents. Less dramatically 
reviewed were policies on anti-corruption: “only” 56% attested “bad” or “very bad” 
influence, while 17.5% argued that the government was taking adequate action. The 
issue of resolution of conflict was equally negative reviewed, with only 32% saying 
that the government’s efforts were positive against 60% negative. Afrobarometer 
further surveyed opinions about the state of economy and asked about the general 
direction they think the country is taking. The Fromager sub-sample was equally 
negative here: About 50% answered that Côte d’Ivoire’s economic situation was “very 
much worse” or “worse” than a year before. Most of them seemed however undecided 
if the conditions of living had improved or not (32.5% more negative vs. 20% more 
positive). When asked if the country is moving in a good or bad direction, 73% were 
rather pessimistic.  
These rather negative reactions of the Fromager might not be surprising due to 
the region’s close connection to Gbagbo. As outlined in Chapter 3, the South, 
especially Fromager, thrived during Gbagbo’s rule because he granted privileges to the 
autochthone cocoa farmers. Whether or not these privileges are still granted, the Bété 
might mostly perceive that they are less fortunate now. These responses might further 
indicate that Fromager is still occupied with accepting the status quo, which is the first 
step in de-escalation mentioned by Ramsbotham et al (2011). Whatever the reasons, 
the overall perception from Fromager respondents of some economic factors and 
conflict resolution is rather negative.  
The third and last issue-block from the survey that is interesting in this context 
is on the state of security and post-conflict. A majority (55%) of the Fromager 
respondents never felt insecure in their neighbourhood or suffered from crime in their 
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own home (70%). In the reconciliation section, Afrobarometer largely surveyed 
support for statements reflecting forgiveness and amnesty versus justice and 
prosecution.97 The survey asks for example if respondents backed the statement that 
“the reconciliation requires the liberation of all political prisoners” (Penar & Mukana 
2013), which a majority of 63% supported. Some survey items put up two contrasting 
statements, one being more focused on “justice no matter what” and being on 
“amnesty and forgiveness”. In Fromager respondents were relatively undecided: with 
amnesty (40%) being trumped by amnesty after trial (52.5%). In another question, 
people supported the statement that perpetrators should be forgiven after they have 
repented  (75%) rather than judging people according to their crimes (30%). It was 
also interesting to cross-tabulate the responses from those who perceived the general 
economic condition of country as bad with the responses on reconciliation. The 
respondents that answered rather pessimistically on the direction the country was 
taking, were slightly in favour of an amnesty law and equal treatment of all parties in 
the justice-seeking process. When however being faced with having to pick an either 
general amnesty or amnesty after conviction however, the pessimistic respondents 
answered less forgivingly.  
It would be too eager to deduce that a perception of decreased economic 
opportunities leads to less willingness to forgive, since it is such a small sample. 
Lacking better data however, it is worth noticing that there are a number of 
respondents frustrated with their economic situation who are not convinced of the need 
to forgive and forget at all costs.  
5.2 Focus Groups – Listen to the farmers  
!
In order to dig a bit deeper and see what local perceptions of communities indicated, I 
conducted five focus group interviews in Fromager: three in co-operatives that 
received investment and two in co-operatives that did not. As outlined in the 
introduction, I had assistance from ANADER, which implements the investment 
project from GIZ and private partners in Fromager.  
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97 Each Afrobarometer survey has a country specific section. For Côte d’Ivoire that was occupied with 
reconciliation and the influence of China. In specific were the reconciliation questions: Q79AA_CDI, 
Q79AB_CDI, Q79AC_CDI, Q79B_CDI and Q79C_CDI.  
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5.2.1 More money to share, too little to spend – non-intervention group  
No money - no workers 
In the focus group without an investment project, all participants were plantation 
owners. So when we asked about job creation, the respondents were not the ones 
potentially demanding work, but rather being the ones possibly offering employment. 
They largely agreed that it got more difficult to offer jobs after 2011, although most of 
them indicated that they needed support because of the large workload. Some argued 
that the revenues, even after cocoa prices increased, were not sufficient to employ 
additional workers.98 Others pointed out, that it was difficult to get men to work for 
them, due to strict regulations. In order to cope with the immense amount of labour, 
the participants mentioned that they, as a co-operative, as well as the community, 
supported each other during harvesting season. Most farmers were solely dependent on 
cocoa and did not have alternative jobs, though some cultivated rice and corn for their 
own consumption. In one group some farmers had intensified cropping hevéa and 
more recently palmnuts, while others “returned” to cocoa planting after coffee proved 
to be less valuable. Even early on in this first section on employment possibilities, the 
respondents voiced issues of land ownership.  
In Fromager I was confronted with two kinds of land rights and co-cropping 
systems (see Chauveau 2006; Chauveau 2000; Bøås & Dunn 2013; McGovern 2011): 
Firstly, the metéage - a system in which revenues from a piece of land are divided by 
three, with the workers receiving one third, while the owner gets the rest. The second 
system, the adokatâ (freely translated into “work it and take it”) has “unused” land as 
its subject matter. This land is trusted to the care of a worker who plants cocoa 
seedlings and cares for the tree over at least five years. When the tree starts to produce 
cocoa pods and revenues start coming, the worker and owner share the reward fifty-
fifty. Members of one group mentioned that the worker receives one part of the land 
afterwards. Both the metéage and the adokatâ system are open to (mis-) interpretation. 
One aspect that was mentioned was that the two different systems were bound by 
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98 Workers on the cocoa farms are usually called “main-d’œuvre”/ helpers. When talking about hiring 
people, the focus groups in the treatment section often talk about hiring people from Burkina Faso/ the 
“foreigners”. They described them like this: “our brothers that came and have been settled here with 
us, that have their fields” or “the people”. 
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ethnicity: metéage being mostly used by Baoulé, while adokatâ is a system used by the 
Bété, who owned land but did not cultivate it. Most of the respondents mentioned that 
the autochthones (Bété/ Baoulé) do not like to work, which reasons why they like to 
employ others over a longer time.99 One younger respondent mentioned that he 
participated in adokatâ because he was not able to buy land. Therefore he invested 
both labour and resources over a long time to work on someone else’s land in order to 
own two hectares afterwards. He was one of the few involved in one of the two 
systems, but said that the adokatâ arrangement did not create any tensions. However 
some participants claimed that there were cases where landowners did not adhere to 
the contract, taking revenues from the workers.  
 I experienced during the discussions that the participants did not always agree 
on the conditions of the systems amongst them, which might cause future tensions. 
However, even though the respondents did see a decrease in job possibilities after 
2011, they seemed quite content with their work situation.   
Improved price and more to get by 
Responses on the second block of questions on yields and livelihood were quite 
diverse. The participants supported the expert’s assessment about the positive effects 
of the reform: All respondents agreed that higher prices, more transparency and better 
planning opportunities had a positive impact on their lives. They said that they 
expected a continued price rise, which I would argue means a hopeful outlook on the 
economic future. One man argued for example that the next seasonal price will be set 
shortly before the elections, so will therefore be higher in order to create some 
goodwill amongst the farmers. Only one farmer mentioned that he received better 
revenues under the liberalised system. This seems to indicate a similar result as in the 
national analysis; farmers suffered immensely during the liberalised system, but are 
increasingly more positive about their opportunities in the new civil economy.  
However most farmers cautioned that regardless of the increased cocoa price, 
their main problem remains ageing trees and decreased capacities. In order to 
proliferate their profits they either have to re-plant or use fertilisers. Both options 
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99 “It is being said that the autochthones (those that own the land) do, in general, not like to work”. 
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demand heavy re-investment of their scarce revenues.100 One co-operative board 
member discussed the issue of bean quality, and pointed out that the stabilised price 
helps farmers to plan their harvest 
since there was no longer a need to 
“rush” into selling at a high price. 
He said that this satisfies many 
planters and makes them appreciate 
the reform. It is worth underlining 
here that most respondents perceive 
overall improvements to their 
livelihoods. Although they might be 
small, one could argue that the 
farmers perceive that they might 
share their part of the “peace 
dividend” (Junne & Verkoren 2009) after the years of liberalised prices. However the 
state efforts seem to not be fully successful in order to create a stable growth for the 
farmers, since they seem to have problems replanting in large quantities.  
Reintegrating into what? 
In the last block of questions I asked about the re-integration of former fighters and 
social cohesion between different communities. When it comes to re-integration of 
combatants, most co-operative members said that they had not experienced former 
fighters returning and trying to integrate in civil life close by. One of them told that he 
once received six ex-combatants asking for work at his farm. Each of them obtained a 
piece of land, most likely as part of a metéage, and he had no troubles with them. In 
the other group a couple of participants told about some guards and watchmen that 
were dozos during the crisis. They returned to the village and their jobs and have 
integrated into civil life.  
All respondents argued that they saw no problems between different ethnic 
communities. I was surprised by the swift response on that issue but when we asked a 
bit more, some farmers acknowledged that there were occasional conflicts, or 
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100 One farmer put it like this: “It is getting better, but that is not sufficient”. 
picture 6 One cooperative in Fromager 
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“divergences”. For example, one planter agreed to help another but did not show up, or 
co-operatives collected the cocoa from the farmers but delayed paying them. 
Participants argued however that issues are settled pretty quickly with the help of 
delegates from each community, who discuss problems first amongst themselves and 
then inform the chief or local administration in cases where they cannot settle the 
dispute.  
I asked some questions about the participants’ expectations concerning this 
year’s election and possible violence. This was a surprisingly sensitive topic, as 
respondents had underlined that politics do not belong in the co-operative. I thought 
this was an interesting indicator how delicate issues of political expression are in Côte 
d’Ivoire. This might be another indicator that country is still struggling with the first 
step of reconciliation, trying to accept the status quo but not yet being able to face and 
acknowledge major difficulties. Both groups argued that they did not expect the 
elections to pose a threat for them or the social cohesion with other communities, 
unless the children of the old owners provoked fights with the new land owners.101 I 
found this open and brief evaluation surprising, because the participants were much 
blunter about the underlying tensions with the autochthones than I expected. They 
briefly reflected on the post-election violence from 2011, acknowledging that there 
had been a problem in the village. They quoted an incident in which “passion won 
over reason” and it was difficult to control the emotions. They were however very 
reluctant to go into detail, and preferred that we did not ask further questions regarding 
that incident. This might be reflected by Ramsbotham et al (2011) who describe 
Rigby’s framework in terms of trauma-settlement. They argue that post-conflict 
societies vary between the poles of vengeance and amnesia (what they call “forgive-
and-forget”), with the later being “one way of ‘moving on’ for societies” (ibid., p.250). 
I am not sure if this description of forgiveness is the proper one for what the focus 
groups discussed. The general amnesia might however be a way of avoiding the heavy 
task of forgiveness, and instead concerns the more secure immediate future.  
Pugel and others (Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007) indicate 
that it is difficult to assess successful re-integration, social cohesion and reconciliation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 “In general it the children that drive a wedge between the communities”.  
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To get a better and more nuanced understanding of how close the relations between 
the different communities really are, I therefore asked the participants if they would 
want to live with or marry their daughter off into another ethnic community (see Bøås 
& Hatløy 2008; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007). The participants reflected that already 
a month after the crisis, political associations were not noticeable and outsiders were 
integrated into society. They said that they themselves felt very welcomed by the 
autochthones.102 Asking the other group about the degree of closeness with different 
communities, they answered that there is a lot of solidarity, for example inviting each 
other to weddings and funerals. They further outlined that they are not only living 
together, but also working across community-borders in the settlements (“on se 
melange”/ “we mix”). However, one participant indicated that there are some 
communities not too eager to work.103 Especially amongst the young men, there were a 
number of “good-for-nothing” people who were smoking and stealing and therefore 
not suitable for work.104 
No investment – no reconciliation? 
In summary, it seems like the revenues from cocoa are not sufficient to employ the 
much-needed workforce and that the partially-contested land management systems are 
practiced in order to get access to land. The new pricing system increased farmers’ 
income and quality of cocoa, but the ageing of trees remains a key problem. The focus 
groups without the investment project recollected some instances of integration of 
combatants and did not encounter many problems. However some conflict trends 
continue to simmer under the surface of cross-community living. One aspect that I 
found noteworthy in these focus groups was the issue highlighted by Wennmann 
(2011, p.75). He argued that it is important to create a civil economic vision that 
people can start believing in. From the group sessions, I saw this was more apparent in 
the context of the focus groups without investment. This might be the case because 
these groups largely consisted of “foreigners”, who might perceive themselves to be in 
a much better position after Ouattara took office. These focus group respondents 
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102 “It is us that has been received here”. 
103 “there are communities that do not like to work too much”. 
104 I was asking whether these guys were former combatants, which the participants neglected to 
answer. 
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largely referred the government as the main actor, creating the inclusive growth that 
Grossmann et al (2009) discuss. Besada and others (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Besada 
et al. 2009; Grossmann et al. 2009) refer to the essential role that private investment 
can play in restoring markets and generating employment (Besada et al. 2009, p.7). In 
the communities that were not taking part in the ANADER project, there seems to be a 
lack in private investment that could have this kind of positive impact. There are 
problems in employing migrant workers, which are not solved by employment for 
local workers but instead by using each other’s help in the co-operative. The non-
investment groups did not give any account of intergroup contact and re-integration 
into the cocoa value chain as suggested by Tobias and Boudreaux (2009). Instead there 
seem to be indications that the respondents want to “move on” and at least forget, 
though maybe not forgive, the past atrocities. 
5.2.2 Coming back to land of your parents – the investment group 
!
When looking at the results of the focus groups that received an intervention, there are 
a couple of similarities but also larger differences in regards to reconciliation and 
investment.  
No money and no work 
I heard very similar opinions regarding employment, with participants saying that 
there are fewer opportunities to employ workers than before 2011. Although most 
farmers mentioned that they had more than enough to do on their plantations, they 
argued that prior to 2011 they had more money available to hire people and that is was 
easier to employ relatives to come down South to help.105 One man said that people 
had to be careful when employing others, since some of them are only working in 
order to get a piece of land for themselves instead of taking care of the owner’s 
plantation. According to him, that was the reason why he prefers to work with other 
co-operative members or with short-term employees for specific tasks.106 Another man 
mentioned that he stopped météage because of the negative experiences he had 
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105 They said that the government has suspended the import of workers from Burkina Faso (“the state 
demands of us to not bring any people”) that it was “forbidden” now. After that a lot of Burkinabe 
apparently travelled back or worked on their own plantations.  
106 “Because they come to look for something for them (...), so it is difficult”. 
This has been a trend from before the crisis as well, the man underlined. 
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working with “foreigners”.107 This in my opinion indicates that the land rights system 
and the issues of land ownership still have the potential to create tensions. Even with a 
training programme and investment projects in the communities, there seems to be a 
lack of trust, yet no contact and increased intergroup understanding as described by 
Tobias and Boudreaux (2009). Most of the groups’ participants recollected rather 
negative experiences with foreign workers and preferred to support each other, i.e., 
inside their community, instead of employing other or entering into land-management 
systems. Since most farmers keep to their own fields and plant cocoa, there seems to 
be an increasing abstraction from the working life and realities from the other 
communities. Where the tutorat historically offered an almost family-like relation, the 
communities from the focus group that have received investment largely keep to 
themselves. 
!
Picture 7 Another cooperative in Fromager 
“Poverty of hell”  
The second block of questions was occupied with the issues of farmers’ livelihoods 
and increased yields; and here I got much more negative feedback than in the other 
discussion groups. One man was said: “Before the crisis we had poverty in times of 
emergency, but today we have poverty of hell”. In that specific community, the 
respondents mentioned that the price they received during the liberalised system was 
better than the current stable price. They explained that while they received CFA 800-
1000 per kg before 2011, they only get CFA 700-808 today. This is rather odd, since 
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107  “I did, but for a while, I stopped. (...) Because often when they are given a plantation: it's not what 
I want; he has no time; he said that we are all Africans (...) one just can not work”. 
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they quoted a price that was below the officially set price at the time. I gather again 
that these communities might actually have a problem in being paid the right price. 
However, it might again be an indicator that respondents’ perceptions on livelihood 
and economics are highly influenced by the outcome of the conflict, i.e., them being 
on the “losing side”.108 This might further be an indication that Bété cocoa farmers do 
not see the “peace dividends” (Junne & Verkoren 2009) from the new economy. This 
might be an argument against the findings from Johnson (2009), who claims that 
promotion of economic growth lessens ethnic and regional inequalities (ibid., p.54). 
Since this literature is very policy-based, it is hard to argue against them, but it seems 
obvious that either by perception or by real neglect, the “losing side” of the conflict 
might not be as integrated in the new economic vision of peace as is necessary 
(Wennmann 2011).  
The respondents were further very dissatisfied with the selling system, where 
they handed over their cocoa on credit and needed to wait for weeks, sometimes 
months, before receiving their revenues. This was a problem that was also apparent in 
the other focus groups. Like the other participants, they argued that they did not have 
the extra revenues to spend in reinvestments - that instead used it to pay for medicine, 
school fees and other larger expenses. Only one group out of the investment-receiving 
section mentioned that the price has increased and that they see (slight) positive 
changes in the way the cocoa is being sold. One man criticised for example the liberal 
pricing system being only good in theory,109 but did not positively impact the quality 
of the cocoa. He said that the exporters were the winners of the liberalised price 
system, while today’s system assists the farmers to profit.110  
Regarding the yields of the cocoa farmers, the picture is more or less the same 
as in the other focus group. Most planters have old trees with a declining production. 
They know by experience and after various training programmes that they need to 
replant, use fertilisers, pesticides and certain techniques. But this is too expensive for 
most of them. An interesting point was mentioned on several occasions in one of the 
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108 Before the pubs were full with young men after harvesting season, now they are empty: “we 
became poor, it is nothing; we are not happy, we are not at ease”. 
109 “Before there was liberalisation. The liberalisation was coming, in the theory it was good, but the 
practice was not good”. 
110 The exporter, the so-called acheteur, could buy a kg for CFA 500 and could sell at CFA 800/1000. 
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discussion groups, that there were told (by the exporters and others) that they should 
not use a certain herbicide due to its toxic content. This was mentioned as a negative 
aspect in two groups, since these toxic products apparently increased production 
considerably. This was amongst the few times that the discussers actually mentioned 
the influence of the cocoa exporters and NGO-business networks.  
These negative perceptions amongst farmers might have negative implications 
for the sustainability of the peace (see De Soysa et al. 1999; Chauveau & Richards 
2008; Schneider & Gugerty 2011), if they feel left out of the peace-building process 
and the civil economy over a long time.  
Does investment have an impact? 
An essential point with the division in focus groups was to see if the intervention of 
ANADER had a noticeable impact on the lives of the farmers.111 Therefore I asked in 
the three communities that had received such training if they perceived any changes. 
There the results were not as easy to conclude. Most participants mentioned that they 
learned more about the importance of producing quality cocoa and farming theory as 
well as how to plan their revenues and finances, which should raise their surplus a bit. 
But a large number of participants saw no real improvements in living conditions, 
since they still lack the money to actually implement all these changes. One of the 
participants but it nicely in saying: “if someone comes and just talks about helping 
you, without putting anything on the table, then I wouldn’t call that help”. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this thesis is not a programme evaluation and the results 
of the farmer business schooling in the three communities are highly contextual, 
however, it might be still worth discussing some aspects of the investment impact. 
From the focus group’s feedback one of the main problems in order to increase 
livelihood is the lack of capital. This might be similar to the results from Batmanglich 
and Enria’s (2014) study. They did not conclude with a real outcome from (foreign) 
investment in creating jobs in fragile contexts. Two aspects from their study might be 
found in the context of the cocoa value chain in Côte d’Ivoire. Firstly, Batmanglich 
and Enria (2014) perceive that programming in Liberia and Sierra Leone had an 
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111 The cooperatives that participated in the groups had not only been in farmer business schooling but 
further received input from champs d’école etc.  
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unrealistic and infeasible framing of the problem in terms of the capacities of the post-
conflict economy. There might be a similar knowledge gap for programming with 
livelihood projects in Fromager, where short-term and long-term possibilities differ. In 
addition, Batmanglich and Enria (2014) argue a lack of innovation and creativity when 
working in fragile contexts. They argue that high-risk countries demand smart 
solutions and linking up projects is something that can be possibly found in the case of 
cocoa investment. Only teaching good practices without offering adequate capital for 
cocoa farmers to make essential changes might be an example of lack of link-up that 
could potentially improve livelihoods.  
One aspect that appeared to me whilst conducting the focus group interviews 
was the very limited presence of the multinational businesses on the local level, which 
could be a source of potential livelihood improvement and jobs (see Wennmann 2011, 
p.101; Iff et al. 2012; Grossmann et al. 2009, p.70). It seemed that the NGOs and the 
governmental partners were very much engaged on the ground but that the exporters 
and manufacturers were less involved. I found this rather puzzling, since the cocoa 
supply mainly relies on the change in production patterns and considerable increase in 
yields in order for the export figures to remain stable. This might be an indication of 
some of the outputs from Bray (2010) who claims that wealth-generating activities 
often lag behind when investment is done in fragile contexts.  
Re-integration and the community  
The latter questions surveyed the state of re-integration and social cohesion, which 
was the aspect that differed most from the other focus groups. Two groups reflected 
rather negatively on the state of social cohesions without having experience with 
former combatants. The last group argued for a balanced understanding of the conflict, 
claiming that both sides of the conflict employed Ivorians and migrants. That group 
mentioned that most of the internally displaced people that were in Gagnoa had 
essentially returned to their homes. Some of the younger ex-combatants that came 
home to Gagnoa apparently received some land from their parents, and are therefore 
fully integrated in the villages.112 This might be an indicator that most of the people 
have returned to their communities and re-enter their former work, similarly to other 
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112 “Children who were on the front that came back to the land of their parents were given land”. 
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conflicts (see also Bøås & Hatløy 2008). Foreigners however had no chance of 
receiving land because this is most likely to be inherited.113 This is an interesting point 
that bears some resemblance to the results of re-integration in agriculture that Lamb 
(2012) refers to. The cases of the Central African Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo especially show that combatants were unable to access to land in 
order to re-integrate into civil life.  
 In that discussion group there were two planters with very different experiences 
concerning the re-integration of combatants into cocoa farming. One man explained an 
episode with a returning ex-combatant who asked to work for him. He agreed, because 
he thought of preventing him from getting frustrated and turning to violence.114 
Another man’s story was much more negative, saying that the young guys that had 
worked for him before the conflict returned and brought other ex-fighters. Because 
they had guns when they came, they were able to take the law into their own hands 
and took his (and others’) plantations by force.115 He tried to contact the chief of the 
community, but claimed that in those conflicts even the chiefs were powerless. These 
two stories do in my view reflect much of the underlying tension with ex-combatants 
in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire. Some combatants, like the ones in the first 
anecdote, might manage to re-integrate into the economics of peace (Kingma 1997). 
But the main issue here is that most of the land is already taken, and the civil cocoa 
economy cannot really offer the absorption into non-violent revenues. As the second 
episode indicates, some ex-combatants still have the means and the incentive to 
engage in looting as a profitable alternative (see Alusala 2011, p.108). In order to 
really create long-term stability and livelihood in the cocoa sector, it seems necessary 
to find solutions to the land rights issue.  
Tensions persist 
Another interesting aspect came up when we asked about the expectations for the 
upcoming election. Most of the respondents argued that the politicians are not really 
interested in the cocoa farmers’ reality and cannot relate to them. This was repeated by 
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113 “But foreigners, here at home, we do not sell forests to, we no longer sell land, the land can not be 
sold because there is so little left”.  
114 “It's better than leaving him to be a robber or thief”. 
115 “Today they ripped these fields from our parents”. 
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others who said “the election is not going to change anything because politics are 
politics” and that the politicians “are not eating with us”. It seems that after a decade 
of conflict, people do not trust politicians to be truly interested in their living 
conditions. I think this could be interpreted as a positive sign, since it might dissolve 
some of the connections between local level conflicts and national patrimonial 
disputes that O’Bannon (2012) and others refer to. O’Bannon argues that “national-
level politicians seem keen to utilize local disputes to help wage their own battles and 
in doing so help create a hostile climate in which more local conflict is likely” (ibid., 
p.4). This increased cynicism against national politicians might open up spaces for 
reconciliation, since local disputes might no longer be driven from the national level as 
before. 
I further discussed the issue of social cohesion asking how the communities are 
living together (see Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007). One 
group for example mentioned that they had been sensitised on how to live together and 
talked about discrimination in the training.116 However, some participants underlined 
that they always lived harmoniously with other communities, even before the 
programme and that there is no discrimination against certain communities.117 Stories 
were told like from one man who talked about his neighbour being a Malinkè and that 
they shared their work and communal life; going to the cooperative meetings, 
transporting their cocoa and working together in the cooperative, which contributes to 
the peaceful living together. A couple of other participants added that there were 
dispute settlement mechanisms in place in case of conflict between different 
communities, but that there were some problems in accepting these settlements from 
all sides.118 
Like in the non-investment group most participants repeated swiftly that they 
live peacefully together, but after a while respondents also shared other views. One 
older farmer was less optimistic, and frightened of the upcoming election. He argued 
that there were still weapons all around and that people were responsible for bad 
actions. Another older man remembered the time before the crisis, how his father 
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116 “The certification and trainings they taught us how to live together”. 
117 “There is no complex of inferiority or superiority; we live in hospitality and solidarity”. 
118 “We eat together, we do everything together”. 
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employed workers from Burkina Faso and how they were living in “perfect harmony”. 
“But one day things were reversed”.  He argued that they know the price of the cocoa 
now, but that it does not help them. This might be another indication that perceptions 
of economic livelihood are highly dependent on whether one is on the “winning” or 
“losing” side of a conflict.119 Some respondents also reflected on newly emerging 
conflicts relating to the tutorat system, which they said did not exist before 2011. They 
argued that after the elections “and with the current president” is it “them” that make 
the law. The discussers argued that autochthones are no longer heard or respected.120 
Now, one of the participants reasoned, the “foreigners command us around”. I was 
rather surprised by the openness of the cocoa farmers, who described their frustrations 
very openly. Here we find again the perception of being “on the losing side” of 
history, which makes the acceptance of the “status quo” according to Ramsbotham et 
al (2011) more difficult. In one of the groups the respondents argued that it was 
necessary for a group or NGO to come in and talk to the foreigners about how to 
behave, and that they should respect the autochthones more.  
I think this reflects two aspects in the context of the post-conflict development 
approach: firstly it shows that external help might be accepted in order to increase 
understanding, possibly through cocoa investment projects. It also shows that there is a 
need for the Bété who “lost” in the conflict, to still be fully recognisable members of 
their communities. Alusala (2011) calls this the need to create “social belonging” 
(ibid., p.12) in communities, to (re-) create in order to secure longer lasting stability.  
What is interesting in the context of the respondents’ views on social cohesion and 
reconciliation is that there was not so much close coordination amongst stakeholders 
and the cocoa business as some reports indicate to be necessary (see International 
Alert 2012, p.5). There are various points of possible contacts for different 
communities, but it seems that the investment in the farmer business schooling did not 
really take up these contact points.  
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119  In that same community there was one Burkinabe that had been in the village for a long time. He 
quoted a proverb saying that “the one who welcomes a stranger and calls it a harmonious home can 
not be contradicted by his guest”. This might have been an indication that he had a different view but 
that custom did not allow for him to complain. 
120 “It was after the crisis we had these problems”; “your workers they not even respect you”; “They 
[the foreigners], they say it is them who are in power”.  
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Investment but not at peace 
All in all, the responses of the investment focus group did offer some more indications 
for the underlying tensions of the land issues and that the crisis did not really help 
anyone to gain on the local level as it might have done on the national level. It showed 
some similarities to the case study by Batmanglich and Enria (2014); investment does 
not seem to have an essential impact on the stability and reconciliation. Most 
investment is not able to create peace dividends and a sense of social belonging across 
different ethnic groups.   
5.3 Conclusion: “The crisis has not helped anyone!” 
!
This chapter offers a number of interesting issues: First and foremost, it seems from 
the preliminary overview of the main results from all groups (see Table 1), that the 
investment has not yet made an impact on the main parameters in the cocoa 
communities. It is the stabilisation of the cocoa price and the ethnic belonging of the 
farmers that seem to however affect their views on their livelihood options more.   
Investment  No investment  Investment   
Creation of 
jobs 
  -very complex/ forbidden process of 
hiring since 2011 
Increase in 
revenue and 
yields 
 -price increased & price decreased  
-severe decrease in livelihood since 
2011 
-need to sell cocoa on credit  
Integration of 
ex-combatants 
-some ex-combatants came and got a 
piece of land (no problems) 
-returning dozos fully integrated  
-young ex-combatants returning get 
piece of land from their parents 
-others have no right (sometimes they 
take that right by force) 
-employing ex-combatants in order to 
keep the calm 
Reconciliation  -politics/ elections a sensible topic 
(some incidents) 
-feeling welcome in the community  
-living together well  
-some communities are not eager to 
work  
-politicians were not really interested/ 
they have been used  
-had some incidents  
-‘foreigners’ are making their own rules 
-no respect for the autochthones  
Table 1 Main differences between focus groups 
It is also interesting that people in the cocoa communities are living very close to each 
other and take part in other communities’ daily and special rituals. However there was 
a large continued grievance in all the groups. From the “migrant” side, they feared that 
autochthones’ children could stir up trouble. From the autochthones’ side, they point 
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towards the lack of respect and instances of being “robbed” of their own land. These 
tensions can become real, although they seemed to somewhat simmer under the 
surface and were only discussed after some time.  
Another noteworthy point here is the aspect that the “victor’s justice” that has been 
portrayed on the national scale seems to have a trickle-down effect on the regional 
scale. Anecdotes for example of the local chief being told-off by the “young migrants” 
because he is a Bété (investment group) or the ex-combatants taking the law into their 
own hands and taking a piece of land. Perceptions of the winning and losing sides that 
affect the perspectives of their livelihood are of course highly subjective, but these are 
narratives that could potentially threaten the social cohesion. If the stabilised cocoa 
price were to decrease, one might see these underlying grievances re-surface, since 
those communities that perceived the prices to be lower than before 2011 did have a 
more pessimistic outlook on the state of social cohesion.  
A third issue that I think is noteworthy is that the possibilities for re-integration 
into the cocoa sector are rather limited. In most focus group discussions, respondents 
argued that there is no land left for cocoa plantations. Those that have been active in 
cocoa before the war and returned might be able to “steal” some land. But there seems 
to be no institutional approach to try to include former combatants into cocoa farming.  
A fourth and last point that is also connected is the general negative perception 
of livelihood. That might be an aspect that is even more apparent further north or 
further west, but is a different kind of perception than the largely positive outlook from 
people I talked to in Abidjan. This might be a further indication of how a lack in 
investment in infrastructure in certain areas impacts perceptions of the future.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion  
!
This thesis has tried to critically assess some aspects of the capitalist peace and the 
large capitalist development agenda by reviewing Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa value chain. It 
has reviewed the research question of whether investment in the cocoa value chain is 
able to have an impact on the state of reconciliation. I find a number of surprising 
answers to that research question that I will review and put into a larger context.  
6.1 The Macro and the Micro-Level and what they have in common 
!
On the macro level we see the debate of reconciliation versus economic recovery. 
Most national experts and informants underlined the need to move on. Reforms and 
programmes to revitalise the cocoa business are seen as good steps taken by the 
current government, private sectors and donors to ensure stability in the country. The 
experts however, did not think that integration of former combatants into the cocoa 
sector was possible. On the micro-level, people still encountered difficulties in the 
aftermath of the conflict and the liberalised price system. The reform of the cocoa 
sector, not so much the investment, offers better yields and improved livelihoods, 
while job creation and re-integration of combatants remains difficult. Issues of ethnic 
belonging and perceptions of being on the “losing” or “winning” side of the conflict 
seem to be more important than the investment projects. This indicates that the 
“winner’s justice” that is criticised on the national level seems to have a local 
counterpart.  
Regarding the evaluation of the capitalist peace theory, I posed some general 
questions in the start of this thesis, which I would now like to answer. Firstly, the issue 
of whether investment can change individual behaviour, which in turn causes peace. 
That might be the case on a superficial level. However, as the case of Côte d’Ivoire 
shows, this assumption neglects the aspects of individual abilities as well as social 
cirucumstance, as has been seen in the issue of re-integration into cocoa farming.  
Secondly, I analysed the question whether investment and 
development/democracy create a framework that has a conditional pacifying effect. 
The answer is again “to a certain extent”, since both development and democracy 
should increase the chances that people are content with their political system, and less 
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likely to relapse into conflict. As outlined in Chapter 4, this question is however very 
hard to answer, because the individual effects are hard to disaggregate.  
Thereafter I asked whether the integration into a capitalist market has pacifying 
effect due to better protection of contracts and property. Here, capitalist peace is 
highly biased from the Western model, which makes it difficult to find the same 
assumptions elsewhere. As the Ivorian case shows there is no necessary link between 
participating in the capitalist market and being able to protect property.  
The last question concerning capitalist peace was whether global investment 
could increase accountability and transparency, which in turn could be perceived as 
pacifying. Again, to a certain extent the investors can influence the accountability 
standards in a country. Under the scrutiny of global investors, certain ground rules of 
transparency in the value chain have to be met. However it is still possible, if not at 
times wanted, that a large amount of information is not accessible in order to keep 
lucrative win-win deals between government bodies and businesses alive.  
Thereafter, I reviewed the three aspects in which private companies, the 
international community and non-governmental actors might have an impact on the 
local level, namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of 
livelihood. Most of them seemed not be drastically impacted by the private-NGO 
networks, but were rather affected by the state-led intervention of a cocoa reform. 
6.2 What does that mean? 
!
"Economic development itself is certainly no guarantee against violence. But a lack of 
development can be a guarantee for resumption of violence." (Junne & Verkoren 2009, 
p.2). This statement on economic post-conflict management sums up the two aspects 
that I deem important in understanding the Ivorian case. Firstly, based on the data 
from this thesis, I see the need for a combination of economic factors that most 
Ivorians appreciate with a more conflict-sensitive approach in investment projects. 
Concentrating on economic growth alone might not be enough to win peace in the 
country for the long-term. A second aspect that is interesting from the Ivorian case is 
the relatively positive impacts from the state. It seems that the new government has 
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been very effective in getting things done and moving forward. However it also seems 
necessary to solve some of the root-causes to re-build a country’s stability.  
It is important for me at this point to re-iterate the limitations of this thesis. The 
large actor-network in the cocoa sector makes it difficult to research and collect data. 
The special combination of private sector, governmental, non-governmental and donor 
involvement makes it difficult to segregate single actors’ impacts and inputs. Capitalist 
peace and capitalist peace-building provide a new and interesting theory to review. 
However, it is such a broad framework that has its limits on the definitional 
distinctiveness. This opens it up however for discussing some broader ideas of the 
capitalist peace agenda. As outlined in the introduction, I do not seek to evaluate a 
specific investment programme, re-integration efforts or the economics of the whole 
cocoa value chain. These are all aspects that I think would be interesting to research 
further for the Ivorian case.  
This thesis also offers a number of implications for the capitalist peace agenda. 
Though there are serious limitations to the generalisability of the Ivorian case, it can 
serve as a starting point for case-evaluations for the theory. It is first and foremost an 
indication that the assumptions of the capitalist and economic liberal agenda are too 
general and too focused on the Western state model. This might strengthen the claim 
that capitalist peace does not work as easily on a single case as it does on a global 
cross-section. Furthermore, as the research on the micro-level shows, the integration of 
some peace-building literature might help to explain some of the more individual 
aspects of the involvement of global companies.  
Most importantly, this thesis might show that it is difficult to use only one kind 
of large-scale theory on individual cases such as Côte d’Ivoire. The difficulties 
connected to the collection of data, the somewhat ambiguous assumptions as well as 
the individual case-characteristics might instead be arguments in favour of an eclectic 
approach described by Sil and Katzenstein (2010b; 2010a). Capitalist peace theory as 
well as peace-building literature might be helpful in uncovering different aspects of 
global companies’ and business networks’ activities in fragile countries. This in itself 
is a great real world challenge, which is important to meet with adequate theoretical 
tools. All in all, I do however believe that this thesis could be a note-worthy case study 
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of the broad capitalist peace and peace-building framework in the cocoa-sector of Côte 
d’Ivoire. It could be useful as an example that critically assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses in the capitalist approach, and points to some aspects in which the cocoa 
value chain may be important for the stability of the country. However there is a need 
for research concerning the assumptions of capitalist peace for the African capitalism. 
Further research in the field of private business involvement in fragile contexts is 
necessary to track other possible channels, and cases where global companies 
influence the stability of a post-conflict economy.  
6.3 What should be done about it? 
!
Even with the limitations that I am aware of, based on my research and fieldwork, I 
would argue for a number of important aspects and policy recommendations that need 
attention.   
First and foremost, I got the strong impression that firms, NGOs and 
governmental organisations in the cocoa industry need to act more conscious about 
their role in the long-term economic peace-building situation. As outlined above, these 
institutions have a large potential to impact farmers and communities in cocoa-
producing areas that have been deeply affected by the conflict. In my opinion, they 
have a responsibility to be more active to reduce tensions and impact long-term 
reconciliation.  
Secondly, I think that the CSR approach that many chocolate producers and 
value chain actors have developed should be broadened beyond issues of child labour 
and increased productivity. It would be helpful to get more actively involved in issues 
of transparent revenue streams such as “publish what you pay” and “publish what you 
get” in other resources. 
Thirdly, people are eager to “move on” and seem quite satisfied with the 
government’s approach and focus on economic growth. I think however that the 
current government should use the economic progress that the country has experienced 
and settle some business in order to create sustainable growth. For example, they could 
use the growing goodwill for a land reform or a more balanced justice system, as well 
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as a larger economic diversification. If such issues are not reflected upon, spoilers of 
peace that destabilise the country remain likely. 
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ANNEX 1 
Expert Interviews  
Organisation Other information 
GIZ-PROFIAB & PPP Conseiller - Partenariats Public-Privé 
GIZ-GISCO Local Representative  
North-American Grinder Cocoa Sustainability Expert 
World Cocoa Foundation Country Representative 
Conseil Cafe Cacao Cacao Expert 
African Development Bank Group Chief Irrigation Engineer 
African Development Bank Group Country Representative for CI 
GIZ-SSAB Technical Consultant  
GIZ-PROCACAO Project Leader  
TechnoServe Deputy Country Director 
World Bank Project Leader-Conflict and Social Development Unit  
Table 2 Expert Interviews 
Focus Group Interviews  
Treatment/ 
Non-
Treatment 
Location Participant Features Number of 
participants 
Ethnic composition 
Treatment  Wanéwa Females (25-50) 10-12 Mostly Bété 
Treatment  Wanéwa Males (40-75) 6 Mostly Bété, one Burkinabe 
ADD.  Wanéwa Females (30-50)  14 Mostly Bété 
Non-
Treatment  
Galebre  Males (35-60) 11-12 Mossi/ Moré, Senoufou 
Non-
Treatment  
Bayota Males (40-65) 10-11 Mossi/ Moré, Senoufou 
ADD.  Bayota Male  1  
Treatment  Gagnoa Males (40-65) 8  
Table 3 Focus Group Interviews 
Outline Focus Group Interviews 
 
WELCOME 
Thanks for agreeing to be part of the focus group. We appreciate your willingness to 
participate. 
 
INTRODUCTIONS 
Moderator/ Interpreter and EMN 
 
PURPOSE OF FOCUS GROUPS 
The reason we are having these focus groups is to collect data for the research of EMNs 
Master thesis on the cocoa sector and its role in the reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire. 
We need your input on this and want you to share your honest and open thoughts with us. 
 
GROUND RULES 
1. WE WANT YOU TO DO THE TALKING. 
We would like everyone to participate. 
I may call on you if I haven't heard from you in a while. 
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2. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS 
Every person's experiences and opinions are important. Speak up whether you agree or 
disagree. 
We want to hear a wide range of opinions. 
 
3. WHAT IS SAID IN THIS ROOM STAYS HERE 
We want folks to feel comfortable sharing when sensitive issues come up. 
 
4. WE WILL BE TAPE RECORDING THE GROUP 
We want to capture everything you have to say. 
We don't identify anyone by name in our report. You will remain anonymous. 
  
Questions:  
1) When you compare the situation to the one before 2011: Are there more or less jobs 
available in cocoa? 
2) What about other sectors: Are they alternative jobs?  
 
3) When you compare the situation to one before 2011: How did the cocoa price and your 
revenues change?  
3B) (for ‘treatment group’) Do you think that the investment/ intervention of ANADER did 
change something about that?  
4) When you compare the situation to one before 2011: How are your cocoa yields? Did the 
productivity change? 
5) How do you expect the future to be in terms of jobs and yields? 
 
6) Later this year Côte d’Ivoire is going to have presidential elections: What do you think 
about that?  
7) When you look back to the 2010/11: Do you think that your community is living together 
more or less harmonious?  
8) Do you think the elections this year are going to have an impact on the social harmony in 
your community?  
9) When you think about members of other communities or supporters of other parties: Do 
you want to work together/ live in the same compound/ share family with them?  
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ANNEX 2 
Stata do-file Afrobarometer 
//Afrobarometer MA Thesis  
 
//MACRO Analysis   
set more off  
tab Q79B_CDI REGION 
/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie  
générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la  
justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus  
coupables. 
Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant*/ 
 
tab Q79C_CDI REGION 
/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs  
crimes. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après  
s’être repenties. 
Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s’être repenties pour leurs crimes 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q79AB_CDI REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de  
réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions  
suivantes ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,  
3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q79AC_CDI REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation  
nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n’en  
avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe  
par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les  
parties prenantes 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 
 3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
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tab Q84 REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q84 
Question: A quelle ethnie ou groupe culturel appartenez-vous? 
Variable Label: Votre ethnie ou groupe culturel 
Values: 1260-1264, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 1260=Akan, 1261=Krou, 1262=Mandé du Nord, 1263=Mandé du Sud,  
1264=Gur (Voltaïque) 9990=“Ivoirien seulement,” ou "Ne sidentifie pas en ces termes”,  
9995=Autre, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant 
Source: SAB 
Note: Si le Répondant ne s’identifie pas à un groupe ethnique, c-est-à-dire s’il  
REFUSE de répondre (9998), NE SAIT PAS (9999) ou répond " Ivoirien seulement (9990)",  
alors encerclez 7= Non applicable à Q85A et Q85B et allez à Q85C. */  
 
tab Q85A REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q85A 
Question: A quelle fréquence est ce que les __________ [groupe ethnique du Répondant]  
sont traités injustement par le Gouvernement? 
Variable Label: Fréquence des mauvais traitements infligés à votre ethnie par le  
gouvernement 
Values: 0-3, 7, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Quelques fois, 2=Souvent, 3=Toujours, 7=Non applicable,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant 
Source: SAB 
Note: Si le Répondant ne s’est identifié à aucun groupe à Q84 – c’est-à-dire, s’il a  
REFUSE de répondre (9998), NE SAIT PAS (9999) ou affirmait « Ivoirien uniquement » (9990)-  
alors encerclez 7= Non applicable pour les questions Q85A et Q85B et continuer à Q85C. */ 
 
tab Q89B REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q89B 
Question: De quel parti s’agit-il? 
Variable Label: Quel parti? 
Values: 1260-1268, 9995, 9997-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 1260=Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR),  
1261=Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), 1262=Front populaire ivoirien (FPI),  
1263=Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI),  
1264=Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY),  
1265=Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir d’Innocent (MFA), 1266=Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT),  
1267=Parti des sociaux démocrates (USD), 1268=Union Pour la Côte d’Ivoire (UPCI),  
9995=Autre, 9997= Non applicable, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas,  
-1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q6A REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q6A 
Question: Concernant le futur, prévoyez-vous que les situations seront meilleures ou pires.  
La situation économique du pays dans douze mois? 
Variable Label: Situation économiques du pays dans les 12 prochains mois 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures,  
5=Noem meilleures, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q7 REGION 
/* Question Nombre: Q7 
Question: En général, que pensez-vous de la direction dans laquelle évolue le pays?  
Diriez-vous que le pays va dans la mauvaise ou la bonne direction? 
Variable Label: En général la direction actuelle du pays est-elle bonne/mauvaise 
Values: 1, 2, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Dans la mauvaise direction, 2=Dans la bonne direction,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, - 1=Manquant */ 
//MICRO Analysis   
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keep if REGION==1264 
/* only keeping those observations that are from Fromager 
1160 observations are deleted -> 40 observations kept */  
 
save "/Users/kruenkernchen/epleblomst/uni oslo-master/05. MA Thesis/3. Data & 
Projects/Data/Afrobarometer/Afrobarometer CDI_Fromager.dta" 
 
tab Q5A 
/*Question Nombre: Q5A 
Question: Par rapport à la même époque l’année dernière (C'est-à-dire il y a 12 mois),  
comment évaluez-vous. Les conditions économiques actuelles de ce pays? 
Variable Label: Q5a. Conditions économiques actuelles du pays comparées à 12 derniers mois 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures, 5=Noem meilleures,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q5B 
/* Question Nombre: Q5B 
Question: Par rapport à la même époque l’année dernière (C'est-à-dire il y a 12 mois),  
comment évaluez-vous. Vos propres conditions de vie actuelles? 
Variable Label: Vos propres conditions de vie comparées à celles des 12 derniers mois 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures, 5=Noem meilleures,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q7 
/* Question Nombre: Q7 
Question: En général, que pensez-vous de la direction dans laquelle évolue le pays?  
Diriez-vous que le pays va dans la mauvaise ou la bonne direction? 
Variable Label: En général la direction actuelle du pays est-elle bonne/mauvaise 
Values: 1, 2, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Dans la mauvaise direction, 2=Dans la bonne direction,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, - 1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q8A 
/* Question Nombre: Q8A 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.  
Nourriture insuffisante pour manger à sa faim? 
Variable Label: Insuffisance de nourriture 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q8B  
/* Question Nombre: Q8B 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.  
Manque d’eau potable pour les besoins domestiques? 
Variable Label: Manque d'eau potable 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q8C  
/* Question Nombre: Q8C 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.  
Manque de médicaments ou de soins médicaux? 
Variable Label: Q8c. Manque de médicament ou de soins médicaux 
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Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q8D  
/* Question Nombre: Q8D 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.  
Manque de combustible pour la cuisson des repas? 
Variable Label: Manque de combustible pour la cuisson des repas 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q8E 
/* Question Nombre: Q8E 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.  
Manque d’argent? 
Variable Label: Manque d'argent 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q9A 
/* Question Nombre: Q9A 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille). Ne vous êtes pas sentis en sécurité dans le quartier? 
Variable Label: Ne pas se sentir en sécurité dans son quartier 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q9B 
/* Question Nombre: Q9B 
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous  
(ou un membre de votre famille). Avez- vous craint de subir un crime dans votre propre maison? 
Variable Label: La crainte de subir un crime dans sa maison 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,  
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q27  
/* Question Nombre: Q27 
Question: Concernant les dernières élections présidentielles de 2010,  
laquelle des affirmations suivantes est vraie pour vous? 
Variable Label: Concernant les élections présidentielles 2010 
Values: 0-9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Vous étiez trop jeune pour voter,  
1=Vous n'avez pas été inscrit,  
2=Vous avez voté,  
3=Vous avez décidé de ne pas voter,  
4=Vous n'avez pas trouvé le bureau de vote,  
5=Vous avez été empêché de voter,  
6=Vous n'avez pas eu le temps de voter,  
7=Vous n'avez pas voté car vous ne pouviez pas trouver votre nom dans le registre des électeurs,  
8=Vous n'avez pas voté pour d'autres raisons, 9=Ne sait pas/ne se souvient pas,  
998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q28  
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/* Question Nombre: Q28 
Question: Dans l’ensemble, à quel point est-ce que les dernières élections  
présidentielles de 2010 étaient libres et équitables? 
Variable Label: Liberté et équitabilité des élections de 2010 
Values: 1-4, 8, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels:  
4=Entièrement libres et équitables,  
3= Libres et équitables, mais avec des petits problèmes,  
2=Libres et équitables, mais avec des problèmes majeurs,  
1=Ni libres ni équitables, 8=Je ne comprends pas la question,  
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q63PT1 
/* Question Nombre: Q63PT1 
Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels  
le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s’attaquer? 
Variable Label: Problèmes les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-  
1ère réponse 
Values: 0-33, 1260-1262, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels:  
0=Rien à dire/Pas de réponse, 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus,  
3=Chômage, 4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits,  
7=Agriculture, 8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier,  
11=Transports, 12=Communication, 13=Infrastuctures routières, 14=Education,  
15=Logement/Habitat, 16=Electricité, 17=Eau,  
18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile, 19=Autres services,  
20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité,  
24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique,  
26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions éthniques,  
27=Discrimination/Inégalité, 28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme,  
29=Démocratie/Droit politique, 30=Guerre (internationnale),  
31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole,  
33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse,  
1261=La paix et la réconciliation, 1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques,  
9995=Autre à préciser, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q63PT2 
/* Question Nombre: Q63PT2 
Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels  
le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s’attaquer? 
Variable Label: Problèmes les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-  
2ème réponse 
Values: 0-33, 1260-1262, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels:  
0=Rien à dire/Pas de réponse, 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus,  
3=Chômage, 4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits,  
7=Agriculture, 8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier,  
11=Transports, 12=Communication, 13=Infrastuctures routières, 14=Education,  
15=Logement/Habitat, 16=Electricité, 17=Eau,  
18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile, 19=Autres services,  
20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité,  
24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique,  
26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions éthniques,  
27=Discrimination/Inégalité, 28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme,  
29=Démocratie/Droit politique, 30=Guerre (internationnale),  
31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole,  
33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse,  
1261=La paix et la réconciliation, 1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques,  
9995=Autre à préciser, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
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tab Q63PT3 
/* Question Nombre: Q63PT3 
Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels  
le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s’attaquer? 
Variable Label: Problème les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-  
3ème réponse 
Values: 1-33, 1260-1262, 9995-9996, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus, 3=Chômage,  
4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits, 7=Agriculture,  
8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier, 11=Transports,  
12=Communication, 13=Infrastuctures routières, 14=Education, 15=Logement/Habitat,  
16=Electricité, 17=Eau, 18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile,  
19=Autres services, 20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité,  
24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique,  
26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions éthniques, 27=Discrimination/Inégalité,  
28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme, 29=Démocratie/Droit politique,  
30=Gerre (internationnale), 31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole,  
33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse, 1261=La paix et la réconciliation,  
1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques, 9995=Autre à préciser,  
9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q65A 
/* Question Nombre: Q65A 
Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel  
répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu  
parler pour vous prononcer: Gestion de l’économie? Variable Label: Q65a.  
Gestion de l'économie: manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise  
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q65B 
/* Question Nombre: Q65B 
Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel  
répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu  
parler pour vous prononcer: Amélioration des conditions de vie des pauvre ? 
Variable Label: Améliorer les conditions de vie des pauvres: manière de  
réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9= Ne sais pas/N’en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre, 
-1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q65C 
/* Question Nombre: Q65C 
Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel  
répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu  
parler pour vous prononcer: Création d’emplois? Variable Label:  
Création d'emplois: manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9= Ne sais pas/N’en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q65K 
/* Question Nombre: Q65K 
Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel  
répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu  
parler pour vous prononcer: Lutte contre la corruption au sein du gouvernement? 
!122 
Variable Label: Lutte contre la corruption au sein du gouvernement:  
manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9= Ne sais pas/N’en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q65L 
/* Question Nombre: Q65L 
Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel  
répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu  
parler pour vous prononcer: Résolution des conflits inter- communautaires violents? 
Variable Label: Résolution des conflits inter-communautaires violents:  
manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9= Ne sais pas/N’en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q66E  
/* Question Nombre: Q66E 
Question: Qu’en est-il de vos autorités locales? Je ne dis pas le Gouvernement central.  
Je veux dire votre Conseil municipal ou communal. Qualifier la manière,  
bonne ou mauvaise, dont votre Conseil municipal ou communal répond aux préoccupations  
suivantes, ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
Gestion de l'utilisation des terres? 
Variable Label: Gestion des utilisations des terres par le Conseil municipal:  
manière_bonne ou mauvaise Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,  
9=Ne sais pas/N’en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q79AA_CDI 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AA-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de  
réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions  
suivantes ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers  
politiques 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord,  
2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas,  
-1=Manquant*/  
 
tab Q79AB_CDI  
/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de  
réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions  
suivantes ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,  
3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q79AC_CDI 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation  
nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n’en  
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avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe  
par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les  
parties prenantes 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 
 3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q79B_CDI 
/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie  
générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la  
justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus  
coupables. 
Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant*/ 
 
tab Q79C_CDI 
/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs  
crimes. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après  
s’être repenties. 
Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s’être repenties pour leurs crimes 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q84 
/* Question Nombre: Q84 
Question: A quelle ethnie ou groupe culturel appartenez-vous? 
Variable Label: Votre ethnie ou groupe culturel 
Values: 1260-1264, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 1260=Akan, 1261=Krou, 1262=Mandé du Nord, 1263=Mandé du Sud,  
1264=Gur (Voltaïque) 9990=“Ivoirien seulement,” ou "Ne sidentifie pas en ces termes”,  
9995=Autre, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q89B  
/* Question Nombre: Q89B 
Question: De quel parti s’agit-il? 
Variable Label: Quel parti? 
Values: 1260-1268, 9995, 9997-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 1260=Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR),  
1261=Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), 1262=Front populaire ivoirien (FPI),  
1263=Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI),  
1264=Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY), 1265=Mouvement des Forces d’Avenir d’Innocent (MFA),  
1266=Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), 1267=Parti des sociaux démocrates (USD),  
1268=Union Pour la Côte d’Ivoire (UPCI), 9995=Autre, 9997= Non applicable,  
9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */  
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tab Q95A  
/* Question Nombre: Q95A 
Question: Pourriez-vous me dire si vous avez les éléments suivants à l’intérieur de  
votre maison, à l’intérieur de votre concession ou hors de votre concession:  
Une source principale d’eau pour le ménage? 
Variable Label: Existence d'une source d'eau pour le ménage 
Values: 1-3, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=A l'intérieur de la maison, 2=A l'intérieur de la concession,  
3=Hors de la concession, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q95B 
/* Question Nombre: Q95B 
Question: Pourriez-vous me dire si vous avez les éléments suivants à l’intérieur  
de votre maison, à l’intérieur de votre concession ou hors de votre concession:  
Toilettes ou latrines? 
Variable Label: Existence de toilettes ou latrines 
Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Rien, pas de latrines disponibles, 1=A l'intérieur de la maison,  
2=A l'intérieur de la concession, 3=Hors de la concession, 9=Ne sait pas,  
998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */  
 
tab Q5A Q79AA_CDI 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AA-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de  
réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions  
suivantes ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers  
politiques 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord,  
2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas,  
-1=Manquant*/  
 
tab Q5A Q79AB_CDI  
/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de  
réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions  
suivantes ou n’en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:  
La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d’une loi d’amnistie 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,  
3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
tab Q5A Q79AC_CDI 
/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI 
Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d’Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation  
nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n’en  
avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe  
par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes? 
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les  
parties prenantes 
Values: 0-4, 9, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 
 3=D’accord, 4= Tout à fait d’accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */ 
 
 
tab Q5A Q79B_CDI 
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/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie  
générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la  
justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus  
coupables. 
Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant*/ 
 
tab Q5A Q79C_CDI 
/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI 
Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.  
Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. 
Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs  
crimes. 
Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après  
s’être repenties. 
Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s’être repenties pour leurs crimes 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D’accord avec Affirmation 1,  
3=D’accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d’accord avec Affirmation 2,  
5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,  
-1=Manquant * 
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